CONFIDENTIAL

48/GS/S



Morocco

March 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080026-9

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

The basic unit of the NIS is the *General Survey*, which is now published in a bound-by-chapter format so that topics of greater perishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters—Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geography, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the *General Survey* coverage may be bound into one volume.

Supplementing the *General Survey* is the NIS *Basic Intelligence Factbook*, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key statistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations.

Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those previously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid.

A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the *Inventory of Available NIS Publications*, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.

Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the *General Surveys* can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.

The *General Survey* is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

WARNING

The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be released or shown to representatives of any foreign government or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1.

For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official purposes to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey.

Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification/control designations are:

(U/OU) . . Unclassified/For Official Use Only
(C) . . . . . Confidential
(S) . . . . . Secret

This chapter was prepared for the NIS under the general supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, Department of Commerce. Research was substantially completed by November 1972.

Morocco

CONTENTS

This General Survey supersedes the one dated January 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080026-9

FIGURES

The Society

A. Introduction (C)

With a rich history encompassing periods of imperial expansion and foreign conquest, as well as brilliant cultural achievement and intellectual stagnation, Morocco has long been recognized as a distinct country. Nonetheless, the Moroccan people, divided in the main between Arabs and Berbers, do not yet constitute a cohesive society. Although the Berber-speaking minority has rarely manifested separatist tendencies, Berber-Arab frictions are not unknown, and the almost universal allegiance to Islam has not entirely breached original cultural disparities between the two groups. Moreover, Morocco's urban and rural areas represent almost two separate worlds, the one influenced by economic and social modernization and displaying an essentially French cultural orientation, and the other clinging to an ancient, tradition-bound way of life in which loyalty to one's kinship groupings takes precedence over identification with the nation. Independent since 1956, after 44 years of French tutelage, Morocco is struggling to become a modern state, but progress has been slowed by a legacy of internal conflict and economic underdevelopment and by disagreement over national goals and political procedures. Efforts to raise living levels have thus been retarded, and the material well-being of the populace has not kept pace with rising popular expectations or with the rapidly growing population. Nonfulfillment of expectations, in turn, has given rise to economic, social, and political discontent.

Berbers were the earliest known inhabitants of the area that is now Morocco. Because of the strategic location of their homeland, the Berbers experienced successive waves of invasion in ancient times, beginning with the Phoenicians. From the first century B.C. until the fifth century A.D., the area was a Roman province, and thereafter Vandals, Visigoths, and Byzantine Greeks successively ruled. Finally, in the late seventh and early eighth centuries, Arab forces from the east occupied Morocco, beginning the process of acculturation by which Berbers converted to Islam and gradually began to adopt the Arab language and some Arab folkways associated with Islam. Both Arabs and Berbers identified themselves with tribes, which constituted the basic sociopolitical institution. The rule of the sultan rarely extended throughout the country, and in fact Morocco's history was characterized by a constant struggle between two regions, the "lands of dissidence" (*bled al-siba*) and the "lands of government" (*bled al-makhzen*). Geographic and social division, however, was moderated by unifying economic and religious forces, and communication between the two zones was facilitated by pilgrims, members of religious brotherhoods, and itinerant artisans and students (see the Country Profile chapter, The Weight of History).

Although contact with European culture was to transform Morocco after the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1912, the direct benefits of modernization were confined to an infinitesimally small group. Only a few thousand Muslims received a French education, and few native merchants were able to compete with Europeans. Even the well educated were unable to acquire jobs in the largely French administration. The French, moreover, made no systematic attempt to assimilate the Muslim community, and social intermingling between them and the Moroccans was rare. Among the principal agents of cultural change were native soldiers serving in the French Army, although they were ill equipped to mediate between the two cultures. The Qarawiyin University at Fes, administered by religious scholastics, slowed the pace of social change and helped preserve much of Morocco's traditional character.

When the French departed in 1956, they left behind an indelible but uneven legacy. Because they had created a Moroccan national consciousness as well as a modern nation, independent Morocco is a more integrated and interdependent society than ever before. Social conflict and political crises, formerly only local in scope, now take on national proportions. Tribal institutions are in retreat, and social groups are no longer able to withdraw from national life as they did in the past when challenged by the government.

Significant progress has occurred since independence. The new economic and social order has been broadened and consolidated, rural modernization has continued, and educational opportunities have been considerably expanded. Although the Sharia (Muslim religious law) was not entirely replaced, an independent civil code drawing on Swiss precedent has been established. Exposure to foreign ideas, products, and customs has been widened through increased cultural exchange, trade, and tourism. Moreover, the French community in Morocco, although greatly reduced, continues to exert a substantial influence, manifested by the use of the French language and by French teaching methods and business practices.

Despite some improvement in living conditions, radical social change has not yet occurred, and some rural areas have remained essentially untouched by modern life. Many southerners of the Saharan region still adhere to ancient customs. As a close observer noted in 1969, their farm tools, work methods, crops, and clothes have changed little in 1,000 years. Berber tribal organization has been fairly well preserved, and traditional attitudes still prevail among many tribesmen. Probably no more than 10% of the population are members of the modern social and economic community; even fewer are financially secure.

According to some observers, the monarchy constitutes a partial barrier to more rapid change. Although serving as an instrument for maintaining the country's unity, King Hassan is in some ways a traditional autocrat. Partially European-trained, he is conversant with the modern world and concerned with achieving social justice for his people. At the same time, however, his position is dependent on the loyalty of traditional elements—the tribes; an army composed mainly of Berbers; religious leaders who view the King as an imam, or commander of the faithful; and important families existing in a client-patron relationship with the monarchy. To provoke these groups by promoting a radical social transformation would likely endanger the King's position and release uncontrollable political and social forces.

Hassan's gradualist approach notwithstanding, the intensity and pace of change have produced a profound social malaise among many elements of society. Old patterns have been eroded, and new ones are not yet well established. Social relationships are in flux, resulting in the disorientation of family life and the development of new classes and new conflicts. Corruption, never far below the political surface, has spread throughout society, while nepotism, favoritism, and the traditional baksheesh (handout) appear to have been institutionalized by the government. For the first time in Moroccan history, a potential revolutionary challenge to the royal system itself, rather than to individual kings or dynasties, has emerged.

As perhaps manifested by the bloody coup attempt of 10 July 1971, in which many government officials were killed or wounded, and the second attempted coup on 16 August 1972, Morocco is faced with grave economic, social, and political problems. Unemployment is high, levels of living are low, and social unrest, particularly among educated youth, is increasing. A number of observers feel that if the King does not soon address himself to real and rapid reform, the result is apt to be increasing instability, perhaps accompanied by widespread violence.

B. Structure and characteristics of society (C)

1. Ethnic and cultural groups

Morocco is a pluralistic society composed of disparate ethnic, linguistic, and tribal groups (Figure 1) held together in large measure by a common religion and loyalty to an ancient monarchy. Constituting 99.1% of the population in 1971, Moroccan Muslims consist of Berbers, Arabs, Negroes, and those with some Negroid physical characteristics, who are known in the south as *haratin*. Although the Berbers are the indigenous inhabitants of Morocco, the Arabs are the dominant ethnic group, having largely shaped the country's political and social history during the last 1,000 years. Nevertheless, because the number of Arab immigrants from the Middle East was at all times a small percentage of the indigenous population, most Moroccans are simply "Arabized Berbers." More than 700 Arab and Berber tribes inhabit Morocco's plains and mountains. Although their social mores are basically similar, regional variations exist, and their life styles are distinctly different from those of urban dwellers. The proportion of Negroes and *haratin* in the country is probably less than 10% of the Muslim population. Since independence, the European and Jewish communities have been dwindling, the former group, mostly French, declining from 3.4% of the total population in 1960 to 0.7% in 1971, and the latter from 1.4% to 0.2% during the same period.

Government policy, on the whole, is tolerant of these various groups. Berbers serve in the cabinet and the civil service and are amply represented in the



FIGURE 1. Area concentration of ethnolinguistic groups and major tribes (U/OU)

armed forces. According to the constitution, Arabic is the official language of the country, but Berber is among the languages used in the state broadcasting service and in some schools. The European and Jewish communities are officially protected, although popular passions may be aroused against them in times of international crisis or social stress. The French still exert considerable influence, manifested by the continued use of the French language in government and business circles and the prevalence of French educational and commercial practices. Seizures of European land have been gradual for the most part, and compensation is offered. The remaining Jews, most of whom reside in Casablanca, also retain some influence, particularly in modern economic enterprises. Some serve in the civil service, a few in high positions. Nevertheless, many Jews are skeptical about their future, especially if the King, whom they regard as their protector, should be overthrown. Consequently, since the July 1971 coup attempt, concern is mounting in the Jewish community, and while a wholesale emigration has not occurred, individual families continue to depart.

The chief ethnic division in the country is between the Arabized majority and the Berber minority, although both Arabs and Berbers belong to the Mediterranean branch of the Caucasoid race. Classical scholarship has generally divided the Berbers into four basic cultural groups. The Shluh (Chleh) are mostly sedentary agriculturalists inhabiting the western High (or Haut) Atlas and Anti-Atlas mountains. The Beraber, whose dominant way of life is transhumance, are found in the Middle Atlas, the eastern High Atlas, and their southern slopes. The Jabala-Rhomara-Riffian group, interspersed throughout the northwest, is composed of sedentary farmers. The smallest group, the Zenata, who are settled agriculturalists or transhumants, are located directly east of the Riffians along the Algerian border near Oujda and on the northeastern spur of the Middle (Moyen) Atlas. A substantial number of Berbers, moreover, have migrated to the cities where they have shed their regional and cultural identities.

The Arabs first entered the country during the late seventh and early eighth centuries as invaders and bearers of Islam. A second more substantial tribal

incursion occurred in the 11th and 12th centuries, and a third group composed of Arabic-speaking Muslims from Spain, not all of them ethnic Arabs, migrated to the region in the late Middle Ages. After their arrival, the Arabs established themselves in the cities in much greater numbers than the Berbers, as well as in the plains and foothills. The city Arabs have always possessed broader social horizons than the Berber tribesmen; however, the life styles of rural Arabs are not much different from those of ethnic Berbers. Most are sedentary agriculturalists, although a few seminomadic pastoralists still exist. The Rguibat Bedouins, called the "Blue People" because the indigo dye used on their clothing rubs off on their skin, are among the last true Sahara nomads, ranging with their camels across wide expanses of southern Morocco, Algeria, Spanish Sahara, and Mauritania.

Arabs and Berbers have coexisted for more than 1,000 years. With the exception of language, no sharp cultural or social boundaries divide them. Both Berber and Arab core communities maintain similar social institutions and values; intermarriage has been frequent, although it has not occurred in all areas; and despite frictions, strong racial feelings do not exist. A significant cultural difference, however, involves a traditionally dissimilar approach to political and social organization. The Berbers were governed by customary law until its replacement in 1956 by a unitary legal system and were ruled by tribal councils of a protodemocratic nature. Berber society, in fact, remains generally less differentiated and more egalitarian than the Arab community. In contrast, Arab tribesmen were led by individual, often hereditary, chiefs; city Arabs, moreover, adhered more rigidly to Islamic law than did the Berbers; and Arab tribal organization was more easily modified by the *makhzen*, whereas the Berbers were less subject to government influence.

Negroes are found in increasing numbers from north to south. Most prominent in the area of the southern oases, they may account for up to 75% of the residents of the Oued Draa valley. Many were brought to Morocco by the slave trade, which ended only in the early 20th century. Black concubinage was common among the aristocracy of Fes, and miscegenation was socially acceptable to Islam. In the south, however, the *haratin* are subject to considerable prejudice. Many live in a client relationship with surrounding Berber tribes, cultivating their fields and performing menial work, while others subsist independently as farmers; a substantial number have migrated to the cities.

Cultural diversity is manifested most obviously by linguistic differences. Although the King encourages the use of French among his advisers and, in effect, within the entire government, most Moroccans speak either Berber or Arabic. The number of Berber-speakers cannot be determined. Estimates range from about 25% to just under 50% of the population, but the number of persons who derive from Berber stock is greater than the number who speak the language. Many of them are Arabized, and according to some estimates, the Arabs together with the Arabized Berbers constitute about 75% of the population.

Scholars usually place the Berber language within the Afro-Asiatic family, which includes Ancient Egyptian, Cushitic, and Semitic. Moroccan Berber is divided into three regional dialects, Tachelhit, Tamazirt, and Zenata, which are mutually intelligible only with great difficulty. These dialects are further divided into subdialects, which may vary in pronunciation from village to village and from tribe to tribe. The primary language of the Shluh is Tachelhit; Tamazirt is spoken by the Berbers and the southern tribes of the Jabala-Rhomara-Riffian group; and Zenata is spoken by the Zenata and by the eastern Jabala-Rhomara-Riffians. Except for one or two minor dialects, Berber is an unwritten language spoken primarily in the mountainous areas. Berber men often employ Arabic to communicate with Arabs or with other Berbers and to conduct business; the women are usually monolingual. Linguistic change, moreover, has been occurring steadily since the first Arab migrations; the pattern is typically from Berber to bilingualism to Arabic.

As elsewhere in the Arab world, Arabic in Morocco possesses three levels of formality. Classical Arabic is the language of Islam. Few other than learned religious scholars understand it, although ordinary Moroccans may know some standard prayers, classical phrases, or passages from the Koran. Literary Arabic is the modern form of classical Arabic; it has a simplified grammar and a modernized vocabulary, and it can be understood throughout the Arab world. It is used in the schools, in the communications media, in official statements by political leaders, and in written correspondence. Most Moroccan secondary school graduates can probably understand and, at least hesitantly, read and write it. Literary Arabic, however, is not well adapted to modern technical and scientific terminology. Moroccan colloquial Arabic is a variant of Maghrebi, a group of mutually intelligible dialects spoken throughout northern Africa as far east as Tripolitania in Libya. However, it is rarely written and cannot be understood by eastern Arabs. Linguists have distinguished three major colloquial Arabic dialects in Morocco: 1) an urban dialect reflecting the speech of the original Arab invaders; 2) a mountain

dialect used in northern Morocco, influenced by speech of Fes,[1] Rabat, and Tetouan; and 3) a lowland version which shows traces of the language of 11th and 12th century immigrants. A fourth dialect has been traced to Hebrew. The distinction between rural and urban Arabic is pronounced, the most elegant forms being spoken in the cities. In the northern towns, many words of Spanish origin are noticeable.

Foreign languages are not spoken in Morocco except by educated urban dwellers and the foreign community. Because of the difficulty of adapting Arabic to the requirements of science and technology, French retains its importance as the language of government, higher education, and modern economic activity. Attempts to replace French with Arabic in these areas have met with limited success. Although Spanish has been eliminated from the formal educational system, it is still spoken in some northern areas.

Because both Berbers and Arabs derive from the same racial stock and have frequently intermarried, ethnic identification on the basis of physical characteristics is difficult and often impossible (Figure 2). "Pure" Berbers have been described as individuals of stocky build, with large heads, broad faces, broad noses, and black or brown eyes and hair. Somewhat taller than most Mediterranean types, they have a slightly higher frequency of light skin, hair, and eyes, particularly among the Riffian Berbers of the north. "Pure" Arabs are short to medium in stature with long to oval heads and prominent high-bridged noses. A tendency toward blondism is evident among those claiming to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, royal courtiers, and wealthy merchants. Negroes and *haratin* can be distinguished from other Moroccans by their darker skins and kinky hair.

2. Social classes

In traditional Morocco, both rural and urban, an individual's place in society was determined at birth, and social mobility was almost nonexistent. The broad social categories were defined by ethnic affiliation, yet the major ethnic communities did not always agree on one another's definition of their rank. Berbers, for example, did not accept an inferior classification, dictated by Arabs, who placed them below ethnic Arabs, Arabic-speaking Andalusian Muslims, and Arabized Berbers, and just a step above Jewish and Christian converts to Islam, Muslim slaves, and Jews. Class consciousness, moreover, was not well developed, and strictly defined economic classes, at least prior to the protectorate, did not exist. Within each ethnic community, however, various distinctions prevailed. While status was always to some extent dependent on personal or family wealth, other criteria, such as family origin, age, occupation, religious devotion, and relationship to powerful political leaders, were also taken into account. A saintly though impoverished person, for example, might consider himself the equal of his wealthier neighbor and be so recognized.

In contemporary Morocco, conventional definitions of class, based on wealth, modern education, and individual performance, have assumed more importance, while respect for age and traditional learning has declined. Where status is no longer determined by the ability to trace descent to a venerated ancestor, it is sometimes redefined in terms of occupation. New groups, moreover, are in the process of formation, others have retained their former position, and some have lost status. Relationships between individuals and groups of different status are also in flux. In addition, the pace of modernization is uneven; traditional status relationships which prevail in one area of the country may have been abandoned in another.

a. Rural classes

At the top of traditional rural society were those with claims to authority over the masses, principally the saintly families, wealthy landowners, a few *grands caids*, and local representatives of the *makhzen*. Somewhat further down the scale were the small landlords, local chiefs, marabouts (saints), and minor functionaries. With the advent of independence, the *grands caids* were dispossessed, and local functionaries were replaced with nonlocal bureaucrats representing the central government. A new rural elite composed of these officials and modern farmers is developing, while the old tribal leaders are having difficulty maintaining their position. A few of their sons have regained lost status by entering the civil service, but they are unlikely to recover their former prominence.

The mass of ordinary tribesmen represent a middle grouping in rural society. Except for their leaders, many of whom are little more than first among equals, few important status distinctions separate one tribesman for another. Berber society is egalitarian, and privileged social categories do not exist. Nevertheless, in certain areas, status is largely determined by the ownership of productive land or livestock. In northern Morocco, for example, the most

[1]For diacritics on place names, see the list of names at the end of the chapter and the maps in the text.

FIGURE 2. Representative Arab (*top*) and Berber (*bottom*) types. Except for small pockets of "pure" Arabs and Berbers, it is almost impossible to distinguish between the two groups on the basis of physical differences. Facial tattoos on Berber women generally indicate tribal background. (C)

respected individuals at present are the "gentlemen farmers" whose "wealth" is based not on material goods but on the crops they produce.

In many areas, the conditions once favorable to tribal independence and to a person's sense of place have been radically upset. French colonization profoundly altered the importance of the tribe. Tribal lands were expropriated, forcing many peasants to become tenant farmers, sharecroppers, or agricultural laborers. The French presence among tribal pastoralists near Rabat, for example, created a new class of rural proletarians who still depend upon wage employment on large farms. Even rural notables have been forced to farm their own land because laborers prefer to work at higher wages on government-sponsored rural projects.

At the bottom of rural society are various depressed groups on the fringes of the tribal system. The most notable are the *haratin*, who, in contrast to former Negro slaves, are looked down upon by both Arabs and Berbers. Although broadened opportunities under the French and the independent government enabled some to purchase property or to migrate to the cities, many continue to perform low status jobs and to cultivate Berber fields in return for tribal protection and one-fifth of the harvest. Other depressed groups, traditionally endogamous and without property, include those engaged in the "shameful" occupations—musicians, dancers, donkey breeders, blacksmiths, tinkers, butchers, and itinerant artisans.

b. Urban classes

In traditional urban society there were four broad social categories: notables, artisans and shopkeepers, unskilled laborers, and depressed persons. Urban notables included the religious aristocracy, a small number of wealthy absentee landlords, and large-scale merchants (*tajirs*), some of whom invested heavily in urban real estate and engaged in international trade. During the protectorate, many adopted Western financial procedures and increased their wealth, creating in the process a new business class. On the other hand, old families associated with the *makhzen*, which the French failed to support, lost their prestige and influence.

The traditional middle group in urban society consisted largely of artisans and shopkeepers. Organized into numerous craft guilds, the artisans comprised the largest element of the urban population and were an important factor in Morocco's political stability. Increasing competition from European goods has decimated these groups, and those who failed to adapt have been absorbed into the lower class. In creating a modern army and bureaucracy, the postindependence Moroccan Government greatly expanded the middle class, which now includes the lower-to-middle ranks of the civil service, lower echelon army officers, policemen, intellectuals, and schoolteachers and other professionals.

Like some elements of the middle class, the lower class is a product of economic modernization. Recently forced off the land by their poverty, many of its members are uprooted, unskilled, ill housed, and severely underemployed. Because their number is growing steadily as migration to the cities continues, these unskilled and often illiterate workers constitute a potential threat to national stability. At the base of city life are also large numbers of economically marginal persons whose occupations are characteristic of earlier periods of urban development, such as poor artisans, donkey drivers, and streetcleaners.

c. National elite

At the top of Moroccan society, drawing upon both urban and rural elements and to a certain extent uniting them, are a few great families, certain groups favored by Moroccan independence, and the religious officialdom. Entry into this elite is limited but not closed, and its size is expected to grow as economic and educational opportunities expand. High social status, for example, is almost automatically conferred upon those who graduate from a university. At the center of national power are members of both traditional and modern groups, informally linked by ties of family and friendship, mutual self-interest, and political ambition. In addition to the royal family, the traditional oligarchy is composed of a small number of landowners, many of them absentee regional chieftains, tribal sheikhs and *caids*, and various interlocked urban clans and merchant families. Their influence has declined since independence, and they are dependent on the King for the maintenance of their privileges. Morocco's financial, managerial, and professional elite includes wealthy businessmen, senior officers in the armed forces, and younger officers serving as provincial governors, *caids*, and directors of civic action programs. Most possess occupational skills useful to the government, and a few enjoy popular political support.

The weakest elements of the national elite, in terms of actual power and security of position, appear to be the religious aristocracy—the ulama (Koranic scholars) and the *shurafa* (plural form of *sharif*, a descendant of the Prophet). Members of the ulama are employed as *qadis* (religious judges), mosque administrators, and heads of pious foundations. An

allied group but less respected by orthodox Muslims are the marabouts, who may possess no venerated ancestor but who are saints by virtue of their good works and their supposed ability to perform miracles. Known as *igurramen* among the Berbers, a few are said to be developing new bases of influence through participation in party politics. All these religious groups are cultivated by the royal family in order to strengthen popular support for the monarchy. *Shurafa* families enjoy the respect accorded to distinguished lineages in a conservative, deeply religious society. Other status distinctions relate to their learning, wealth, and *barakah* (holiness). Highly endogamous, they still exhibit some aspects of a caste group. Although membership in a *shurafa* family is in theory strictly hereditary, their genealogical claims are often spurious.

3. Kinship groupings and family

In the early 20th century, Morocco was in essence a tribal society. Small cities existed, but urban life was largely based on kinship ties similar to those which prevailed in rural areas. Even today, most Moroccans identify themselves as tribesmen. Tribal customs remain particularly strong in the south, where modernization is limited. Nonetheless, political and economic change is eroding the strength of tribal organization, and the largest tribal groups tend to survive only in memory or sentiment. Many desert herdsmen of southern Morocco, moreover, are shifting to sedentary pursuits, and some have emigrated to Europe in search of work. Sedentarization, however, does not necessarily mean a rejection of tribal ways; most of the northern region, for example, has been settled for years, but tribal identification is still important.

The Moroccan tribe, according to conventional definition, is the largest politically autonomous unit in the countryside. Although the Arabic-speaking tribes have not been as well investigated as the Berber tribes, both appear to be structurally similar. Most tribes claim to have a common ancestor, and overall social cohesion is based on this fact. The principle of group segmentation through descent from different ancestors within the same tribe helps to preserve internal order by maintaining a balance of power between opposing kin groups. Genealogical knowledge usually does not extend beyond one's grandfather, at least among the Berbers of central Morocco, although the most prestigious saintly families can often trace their ancestors through some 40 generations back to the Prophet Muhammad.

Traditionally, tribal cohesion also depended upon blood feuds, customary law, and the effectiveness of tribal leadership. External threats were instrumental in keeping tribal groups together, as lack of cohesion usually resulted in military defeat. When the French disarmed the tribes and eliminated insecurity in the countryside, they removed a central pillar of the tribal system. Nonetheless, blood feuds, although dormant, are not dead. Shared memories remain, and tribal enmities persist.

Tribal law has been affected by recent changes, but has not been abolished. In the central Atlas, for example, the collective oath, in which an accused was required to swear his innocence publicly before his male agnates (paternal kinsmen) and the plaintiffs, now takes place in a mosque and is sworn on the Koran in the presence of government officials. Punishment of criminal acts, however, at least officially, is no longer a tribal prerogative. Traditionally, a murderer, if not killed outright by the victim's relatives, was exiled by his tribe, and blood money (*diya*) was paid by his family to the deceased's kin. The French sent murderers to jail, although blood money was still paid. In most tribes, theft was punished according to Islamic law; either the thief paid a fine equivalent to four times the value of the stolen object, or he suffered the loss of a hand. These Koranic rules, however, have been considerably modified by the secular criminal code.

The institutions of tribal government also have been weakened and the authority of chiefs and councils diluted. Arabs have depended more on hereditary leaders than have Berbers, whose chiefs were formerly elected on an annual basis. Although this system has been officially abolished, informal mechanisms have probably been established to accomplish the same purpose. In the Rif, a tribal council rather than a single chief has prevailed, the council being composed of village sheikhs and lineage chiefs. The councils, however, are subject to greater government influence than before, and their powers are limited. The main function of the council in the village of Mediouna, for example, is to adjudicate disputes concerning arable land.

The largest tribal grouping is the confederation, which has been of little practical significance except during periods of extreme crisis. Below the confederation, in order of complexity, are the subconfederation, tribe, clan, subclan, lineage, extended family, and nuclear family. The average size of a tribe is said to be about 10,000, but membership may range from several thousand to 150,000. Group descent from a common ancestor is implied. Although

the tribe may have a patron saint, shared traditions, and occasionally a common flag, it coalesces only in time of danger.

The clan is the largest segment below the tribe whose members claim a common ancestor, real or imagined. Some clans constitute a political federation of hamlets or villages which may contain several hundred families; however, any one clan may exist in two or more widely distant parts of the tribal territory. Village life is usually conducted at the level of the subclan, whose functions have traditionally concerned local administration, ceremonial activities, adjudication of disputes, maintenance of the mosque and cemetery, distribution of water for irrigation, and the division of inheritances. The subclan may be quite large, numbering over 3,000 people. Further subdividing the subclan is the lineage, the largest effective social group whose members can and do trace their origins to a common ancestor; it may constitute the population of a small village or a village segment. A typical Berber lineage consists of from two to four extended families.

The extended family, composed of three generations, is the basic social and economic unit of rural Moroccan life and, to a much lesser extent, of urban life. As in other Muslim societies, descent is reckoned through the male line, and sons frequently continue to live with their parents after marriage, either in the same domicile or in a nearby dwelling. The ranking male of the household, who is not necessarily the eldest, regulates virtually all aspects of his agnates' lives, including their financial affairs, occupations, marriages, and travels away from home. Nonetheless, although family responsibilities ordinarily take precedence over personal desires, the individual is not totally inhibited by kinship obligations. By the mid-1960's, moreover, the nuclear family had reportedly become the predominant kin group in some areas.

As Morocco modernizes, family cohesion diminishes, particularly in urban areas. Expanded educational and occupational opportunities have reduced the need for the extended family as a refuge or informal instrument of social security. In lower class families, fathers may have less control over their children because they have few resources on which the children depend. Independent work does not always lead to emancipation of the young, however, and married sons living with their fathers are known to deposit their earning with the latter. Many urban women have become heads of households, some supporting partially or even totally unemployed husbands. Employment of women, moreover, is creating family tensions by equalizing or, in a few cases, reversing traditional Muslim male-female roles. The size of the household appears to be decreasing with continued migration to the cities, where the family's patriarchal character is less pronounced. In 1960, family size was estimated to average 4.9 persons—5.2 in rural areas and 4.4 in urban areas.

The typical family is dominated by the male; wives and other women play a subordinate role, both in the household and in society at large. Men spend little time at home with their families, and children, although traditionally under their father's absolute authority, are in closest contact with their mother. In theory, women's rights are well protected. According to law, women may administer their own wealth and engage in business without consulting their spouses. Women played an important role in the nationalist movement, and after independence obtained the right to vote. In practice, women rarely participate in contemporary political life or in modern commerce and business, even though each political party and labor union maintains a women's branch. Public opinion, both male and female, is generally opposed to women who work; in fact, female workers are expected to turn over their earnings to their husbands. Attitudes are changing, however, and parents more frequently allow daughters to choose their own occupations. Although most urban Arab women still wear veils, the young *avant garde* are abandoning the practice as a symbol of female subordination.

Nonetheless, Moroccan women exert a powerful social influence, as reflected in the old proverb, "What the devil does in a year, an old woman does in an hour." They perform a significant role in rearing children, teaching religious values, arranging marriages and, through extensive social contact with other women, mediating intrafamilial disputes. According to one scholar, their general lack of education makes them "the defenders of tradition, superstition, religious forms, and obscurantist policies."

In traditional Berber society, men and women apparently constituted almost two distinct societies, each with its own customs, beliefs, and language. Riffian men, even today, are extremely jealous of their women, who are kept secluded. Among most other groups, however, it is common only for the wealthy to practice seclusion, since women of poor families must help their husbands in the fields. Berber women, nevertheless, are evidently permitted a greater degree of independence than Arab women.

Early marriage is still the ideal and the norm, especially for the girl. Civil marriage laws enacted in 1957, and as amended, established the legal marriage

age of females at 16 and of males at 18, and stipulate that if either partner is not yet 21 the written consent of the parents or legal guardian is required. These laws, however, are frequently violated. In the mid-1960's, the mean age at marriage for all rural women was 15.5 years. Of 656 rural men surveyed, 36% married for the first time between the ages of 15 and 19, the mean age being 22.3 years. An important reason for early marriage is the desire of parents to restrict opportunities for premarital sexual relations which, if discovered, would disgrace the family and probably bring retribution upon the girl from her father, brothers, or uncles. Once a girl marries, however, she becomes the responsibility of her husband. Until that time, she is closely watched and supervised.

According to Islamic law, a man may have up to four wives. Polygyny, however, is uncommon. It remains a social desideratum among many transhumant tribes; ideally, a man with two wives keeps one at his permanent home to help with the harvest and sends the other to the mountains to tend the sheep, but such cases are apparently rare. The 1957 civil code permits a wife to stipulate in the marriage contract that her husband may not take another wife; this provision provides her with grounds for divorce if he does. In addition, a prospective bride is entitled to know the marital status of the man she expects to marry.

As elsewhere in the Arab world, marriages are often contracted within a small group. Among the Berbers, marriage is usually endogamous at the level of the clan or lineage. Riffians frequently marry outside the local tribe, but they do not marry Arabs, whom they consider socially inferior, or Berbers from other regions. In the Middle Atlas, marriage with the daughter of one's father's brother is apparently the norm. Among some Berber groups, in fact, a suitor who is not related to the males of the family must obtain permission to marry from the prospective bride's patrilateral cousins Endogamy, however, is an often violated ideal. The marriage taboo, for example, between at least one Ait Atta clan and the *haratin*, their traditional subordinates, has broken down, and mixed marriages between Muslim men of the Western-oriented elite and European women have increased.

Many marriages, even among sophisticated urbanites, continue to be arranged by the family. Future spouses are often not personally acquainted, and even young, educated men of leftwing persuasion are known to ask family elders for permission to marry, although their ideology rejects this practice. However, a father's right to oblige his daughter to marry has been modified by civil law. During the protectorate, the number of marriages designed to advance one's family position markedly increased. As a result, in all major cities, members of the commercial middle class are interconnected in what an observer has termed "an enormous web of marriage alliances."

In rural society and among the more conservative urban families, marriage arrangements and ceremonies are conducted in the traditional manner. Typically, the young man's father negotiates the bride price with the girl's father, sometimes a lengthy process. According to civil law, the marriage contract must be witnessed by two notaries and a judge before it is considered valid. Considerable time often separates the signing of the contract and the wedding festivities, which may last several days or up to a week if the families are wealthy.

Newly married couples usually desire children as soon as possible. The husband wants to prove his virility, while the wife wishes to retain her husband by producing sons, failure to do so being grounds for divorce. In addition, children are often desired to provide security in their parents' old age.

Boys may be circumcised in the first year or later. Because the ceremony, which symbolizes the boy's confirmation as a Muslim, is expensive, poor families occasionally share the cost by having several children circumcised together. In 1971, the circumcision of the Crown Prince was celebrated in week-long national festivities, during which 40,000 needy youths were circumcised in ceremonies sponsored and subsidized by the King. Boys and girls are generally segregated in late childhood, and dating in the Western sense is rare. There is no special ritual at puberty, but it is traditional for adolescents to begin observing the Ramadan fast at that time.

Although family cohesion is weakening, personal conflicts do not appear to be widespread. Divorce has always been common, partly because society emphasizes parental agreement rather than individual choice in marriage and partly because Koranic law strongly favors the man, who simply expresses repudiation of his wife, before witnesses, three times on three separate occasions. Male grounds for divorce are unlimited. While some Berber groups allow the wife to initiate proceedings, women can only obtain a divorce upon proof of nonmaintenance, abandonment, physical cruelty, or sexual abstinence. Among some Berbers of the High Atlas, if the husband agrees to a divorce at his wife's request, he has the right to stipulate the men she cannot marry, although the number is limited by law. This practice was designed

to prevent wife stealing. Few men evidently remain faithful to their wives. In some areas, many frequent prostitutes.

4. Rural-urban community patterns

Patterns of community organization in rural areas, as well as in the cities, are in flux. Change in the countryside has been caused by the disruption of the tribal system and the introduction of new administrative units, such as the commune. Instituted after independence, the commune is designed to facilitate rural modernization and government control in a hitherto highly dispersed, particularistic, and tribal environment. Some government administrators, who see the tribe as a barrier to progress, view the commune as an instrument for destroying the tribal system altogether. A number of commune districts overlap tribal boundaries, others divide tribes into more manageable units, and still others regroup small tribal segments into larger organizations. Each has a governing council, whose responsibilities are limited to problems of local economy, administration, and social and religious affairs. Another government-sponsored effort to modernize rural life with a much greater potential impact is the support of village self-help projects, including the constuction of such community facilities as water lines, sewers, streets, shops, communal ovens, public baths, and dispensaries.

Climatic, geographic, and status factors have determined the great variety in form and structure of Moroccan settlements. The most desirable home sites—those nearest the mosque, local shrine, or streambed—are frequently occupied by the community's most prestigious members, such as saints, major landowners, or tribal chiefs. The isolated farmstead, most common in northern Morocco, has become more typical in other areas since security has been established in the countryside. There are also numerous small hamlets comprising only two or three households. Middle and High Atlas villages are usually located on hillsides for protection against formerly hostile neighbors and for proximity to valley fields. They are often extremely compact; houses in Zaouia Ahanesal, for example, are frequently joined by a common wall, with the flat roof of one house serving as the base or courtyard of a dwelling higher up on the slope. The *ksar* (walled fortress community) is the main settlement unit of the southern oases. Built on flat ground, it is a rectangular structure with corner towers. Inside the walls, houses are situated close together and are usually taller than most rural dwellings in order to conserve arable land in a semidesert environment. Some of these communities contain imposing buildings called casbahs (*kasba*), which once served as fortresses in tribal wars. Now the old sections of the cities are called casbahs or *madinahs*, a word meaning literally city but used to distinguish the old from the new sections. These urban casbahs or *madinahs* house hundreds of people. They consist of dwellings connected by a complex, maze-like system of passageways.

Among Morocco's nomads and seminomads, community patterns are determined by the type and extent of tribal wandering. The Rguibat are pastoral nomads living in tents the entire year (Figure 3), with a movement cycle dependent on available pasturage and water. Transhumants tend to migrate between fairly fixed boundaries, some clans traveling more than 60 miles from their base camp. The Ait Atta, for example, make two moves per year: in the spring they leave their permanent dwellings in the valleys for the Middle Atlas, where they live in tents and pasture their animals; in the autumn they return to the valleys. Other tribes reside in the mountains but migrate down the slopes for winter pasture. Still others, such as the Beni Mguild, live in a middle region between summer and winter pastures. French colonization severely disrupted old transhumant patterns by sharply reducing available grazing lands and by requiring land registration, a process which fractured many communally owned tribal lands. Tribal patterns of land ownership, however, still have not been radically altered.

A central feature of rural life is the market, or *suq* (Figure 4), which for many villagers remains the main point of contact with the outside world and an important economic and social center for the exchange of goods and information. The rural market is usually located on an open site, some distance from the nearest village, yet conveniently situated within the general trading area which it serves. The large *suqs* have permanent buildings for the display of wares, but most sites are deserted except on the weekly market days

Although, in the past, cities were small and few in number, urbanization in Morocco has deep historical roots; Fes, for example, was founded in 808 and Marrakech in 1070. Located in the plains regions for defensive purposes, the cities were almost always surrounded by fortified walls. A central square with a large mosque was common. Major cities were divided into quarters (*haras*) and wards (*haumas*), largely on the basis of ethnic, tribal, or occupational differences. Many have survived intact. In the early 20th century, Marrakech contained a Muslim quarter (*madinah*),



FIGURE 3. Tents are usually divided into two compartments, one for sleeping, the other for entertainment and family life. Household equipment and utensils are primitive and kept to a minimum. This scene is of a festival (*moussem*) held at a saint's sanctuary in Tan-Tan. During May the nomadic tribes gather here. (U/OU)

further subdivided into individual wards for different tribes; a Jewish quarter (*mellah*); and a military quarter where troops were stationed. In most of the cities, with the exception of Casablanca, there were also separate wards for the various occupational guilds.

The protectorate fundamentally changed the character of Moroccan cities. Almost immediately affected were the guilds, whose decline led to a disintegration of the urban social structure, paralleling the detribalization of much of the countryside. Muslims adopted new habits and occupations, moved into new quarters, and lived in new kinds of houses. Extensive rural migration to the cities accelerated the decay of residential segregation by ethnic group and irreparably weakened the system of social control by ward and quarter. In Marrakech, for example, there are no longer any definitive rules governing residence or occupation, and the customary "zoning" practices which determined where businesses could operate have been discarded. Moreover, the large-scale Jewish exodus has virtually eliminated the *mellah*. The *madinahs*, with their old buildings (Figure 5), are in decline everywhere.

The European city imported to Morocco represents the archetype of the early 20th century garden city movement, which emphasized wide converging boulevards, separate industrial, commercial, and residential quarters, and numerous parks, gardens, and tree-lined streets. As a result, urban areas contain sections that are essentially modern, others that are almost completely traditional, and still others that are transitional. Casablanca's basic radial-concentric layout dates from the French master plan of 1922: in the center is the old, compact, Muslim town, while nearby are 20-story skyscrapers and what remains of the first French city, laid out in straight narrow streets lined by four- to five-story houses. European villas lie farther out, while *bidonvilles* (shantytowns) and barracks-like low-income housing are scattered on the periphery. In order to absorb a growing population, a number of new towns have been built, accommodating 30,000 to 40,000 people. Designed as self-sufficient, low income, residential communities with central shopping centers, they have more amenities and wider streets than the *madinahs*. In the 1960's, the Moroccan Government sponsored the construction of several new towns surrounding Marrakech; Mohammedia, for example, is supplied with schools, hospitals, recreation areas, commercial districts, and a bus service linking the town with central Marrakech.

FIGURE 4. Every Moroccan tribe arranges for markets or *suqs*. They generally take place in the open country and are always called by the name of the day they are held. (U/OU)

5. Values and attitudes

a. Basic value system

The central values of society are drawn from three main sources—the Islamic religion, Arab-Berber tribalism, and nationalism. Since the beginning of the 20th century, traditional values have undergone substantial transformation in response to Western political and economic influences, although the extent of change should not be exaggerated. Moroccans remain a basically conservative people, attached to the old ways but receptive to gradual change. Many would agree with the Arab proverb: "Slowly, oh slowly, my children, for we are not in a hurry." While ancient religious and tribal practices have been seriously eroded, virtually all Moroccans, regardless of ideological persuasion, still regard themselves as Muslims, and in the rural areas, at least, a person still tends to identify with a particular tribe. Furthermore, while traditional society shared many common bonds, it was, nonetheless, a varied society whose disparate groups struggled to preserve their own particularistic values and style of life, even to the point of fighting one another.

Among traditional values which most impress the foreign observer are hospitality, self-reliance, tribal egalitarianism, a concern for proper behavior (*caida*) and the avoidance of shame (*hshuma*), and a deep respect for piety and learning. Berber mountaineers stress the virtues of physical hardiness, fighting ability, and frankness of speech and manner, while educated Arabs of the cities attach greater importance to the possession of formal Islamic learning, mental subtlety, and a gift for discussion and argument. Aggressive or flamboyant personal behavior is not countenanced, and reticence is seen as a social responsibility. Stylistic flourishes of language and exaggerated rhetoric are commonplace, but this stems in large measure from a passionate love of the Arabic language.

Although the outward forms of traditional behavior are still generally observed, including deference to the family head, many younger Moroccans reject such

FIGURE 5. The *madinahs* are characterized by maze-like streets and crowded conditions. Most inhabitants are petty traders or traditional artisans. (*left*) Bab Bou Jeloud, one of the entrances to the ancient *madinah*, Fes. (*right*) An alleyway in the *madinah*, Rabat. (U/OU)

patriarchal values as filial piety and female seclusion as symbols of backwardness and humility inappropriate to a modern nation. Discontent is rising among certain groups, particularly urban youth, and old civilities and conventions are often abandoned. These Moroccans, whose new ideas and social horizons were unknown to their parents, value secular education, individual achievement, and material success. Because they no longer completely believe in the superiority of their culture, they are left with a serious problem of cultural identity. The sense of dislocation and insecurity felt by some social groups is well expressed by the protagonist in a 1964 Moroccan novel:

> People say it's better to have no life at all than a life full of holes. But then they say: Better an empty sack than no sack. . . . I don't know how it's going to come out, all this.

The changes occurring in Moroccan values are illustrated by the royal family. The late Mohamed V, who changed his title from Sultan to King, considering the latter more appropriate for a modern monarch, was essentially a traditionalist caught between the demands of religious life and the substance of secular life. He secluded his wives but unveiled his daughters and gave them a modern education, wore Western clothes in private but donned traditional robes in public, rationalized the governmental bureaucracy but at the same time continued the ancient procedures of the court. King Hassan received a modern French education and is familiar with Western thought. In governing Morocco, however, he appears as a conservative, appealing to tradition and using Islamic symbols to justify his rule. In his accession speech in 1961, Hassan set the tone for his reign by promising to perform his duties "in conformity with the principles of Islam, with its spiritual values and with our national secular traditions." Nevertheless, aware of the demands for change of his leftwing opposition, he has declared that Islam is not incompatible with modern socialism.

Members of the Istiqlal party doubt the government's commitment to Islamic values, decry the alleged abandonment of moral principles in society and the increasing use of alcohol and drugs, and stress the importance of Islamic education. Those of leftist persuasion, on the other hand, emphasize secular values and call for the government to

undertake a radical restructuring of society along the lines of a socialist welfare state. Both groups, despite their different emphases, draw on French ideological and organizational concepts, and both stand in sharp contrast to the religious scholars and other traditionalists who oppose all change as a departure from Muslim law and the original precepts of Islam.

Most Moroccans are preoccupied with their private affairs, unaffected by crosscurrents of political activism. Traditionally, Moroccans have been manipulated rather than consulted by their leaders, and royal authoritarianism continues to inhibit the growth of public participation in political life. Although democratic values and an individualistic ethic are gaining strength in the cities, the social and political norms of the majority are still drawn from the tribe, where family and patriarchal values are paramount. Even those Westernized Moroccans who scorn the notion of filial piety rarely renounce their family ties.

b. Basic attitudes

Social pluralism has severely restricted the development of a strong national consciousness. The unifying influence of Islam is counterbalanced by cultural differences, regional animosities, tribal feuding, and a lack of consensus among the intelligentsia. Although independence contributed somewhat to a sense of national solidarity, tribalism is still pronounced, and Morocco continues to be confronted with the problem of unification. Moroccans take great pride in the country as a historic center of Muslim civilization, yet loyalty to the person of the King is a more developed feeling than loyalty to the state and its institutions.

The legacy of tribalism has been a major influence impeding the growth of modern nationalism. Prior to the arrival of the French, feuding within and between tribes was endemic, often originating in disputes over land, water rights, or women. Even today, a general pattern of hostility among component units of many tribes can be detected. Internal tribal animosities have created a considerable amount of mistrust among the people, who tend to suspect one another's intentions. Intertribal feuding also has a long tradition, and although widespread violence between tribes is generally a thing of the past, occasional brawls still occur, particularly in the south, between nomadic and sedentary tribesmen. As late as 1969, armed government intervention was required to contain a tribal clash in Beni Mellal Province.

The tribal world has changed considerably during the 20th century. With the development of modern communications, its exclusiveness has broken down, and tribes have been forced to admit outsiders into their once remote lands. Among many long-settled rural migrants to the cities, moreover, the concept of tribe is losing its meaning. The tribal sector, however, is not fully integrated into the nation. Identification of nomadic tribes with the central government is slight, and ethnic particularism is still pronounced in some areas. The self-identity of the Riffian tribes, for example, remains strong, fostered in part by memories of Abdel Krim's short-lived Riffian republic in the 1920's and in part by resentment of domination by non-Riffians since independence. The Riffians, in fact, revolted in 1958-59. The insurgency, which was forcibly put down by the army, was not an attempt at secession, but rather a protest against government neglect, poor administration, and a lack of educational and employment opportunities. While the government is sensitive to the potential for tribal rebellion in such areas as the Rif, the trend since the early 1960's seems to be one of increasing loyalty to the national government.

The balance between rural and urban forces has always been precarious, and the continuing division between town and country constitutes a major social problem. Some authorities view the rural-urban dichotomy as essentially a conflict between the agrarian-oriented Berbers and the more sophisticated Arabs of the cities, for whom rural values have little meaning. While the Arab townsmen tend to look down upon the Berber tribesmen and accuse them of being "bad Muslims," the Berbers reject the inferior social status which urban Arabs impose on them and claim to be the only "true" Moroccans. As late as 1967, strong "separatist" feelings were said to exist among Berbers of the mountains and the southern plains, stemming from resentment of the political and economic control exercised by city Arabs, especially the elite of Fes. However, it is difficult to know whether these sentiments are significantly different from the traditional tribal opposition to the central government. Despite frictions, the political manifestations of Berber-Arab differences have been intermittent and generally unorganized since independence. The main problems are cultural and linguistic; racial antagonisms are muted or nonexistent.

Divisive attitudes based on regional factors are not unknown. Some hostility, for example, exists between the Riffian Berbers of the north and the Sussi Berbers of the southwest. There are also intercity rivalries and prejudices. A well-known case is that of Marrakech vis-a-vis Fes. The residents of Marrakech reportedly regard the Fassis as intellectual snobs, while the latter criticize the Marrakechis for their carefree ways.



exploitation of Algeria's iron ore fields. Subsequently, the two nations signed a treaty providing for the demarcation of disputed areas.

Moroccans have a strong tradition of respect for military qualities; many are descendants of tribal warriors. The French and Spanish protectorates recruited Moroccans, chiefly Berbers, into their national armed forces during World Wars I and II, in which they established a creditable record. Although Morocco has been generally unwilling to use force to achieve its territorial claims, guerrilla forays against the Spanish Army in Spanish Sahara and Ifni were encouraged in 1957-58, and serious fighting with Algeria over the disputed border took place in October 1963, with Morocco winning a limited military victory. These conflicts notwithstanding, Morocco views its military role as a defensive one, and the army, which continues to rely on Berber units, remains small.

C. Population (U/OU)

As the result of a consistently high birth rate and a high but declining death rate, Morocco's population has grown rapidly, having risen by more than 50% during the period from independence in 1956 until mid-1972, when it was estimated at slightly more than 15.8 million. During the years 1960-71, the population increased at an average annual rate of 2.5%, and the figure would have been higher had it not been for the departure of over 400,000 Moroccan Jews and foreigners, as well as several hundred thousand Moroccan Muslims seeking work in Western Europe. The Moroccan Muslim population, for example, increased at an average annual rate of 2.9% during 1960-71, and it must be assumed, with the departure of most Jews and foreigners from the country, that the annual growth rate during the late 1960's and at the beginning of the 1970's was no less than 2.9% and was probably higher. Growth of such magnitude is a serious hindrance to official efforts to raise living levels through programs of economic and social development. Even in the 1960's, population growth exerted heavy pressure on scarce economic resources and contributed to rising unemployment. Although Morocco has instituted a well-conceived family planning program, there is a wide gap between policy and execution, and to date the program has not served to curb population growth.

Family planning is a sensitive issue from political, sociological, and religious viewpoints. Although increasingly desirous of limiting the size of their families, Moroccans still regard children as an asset and as a form of social security in old age, with from three to five children being considered the ideal number. Nonetheless, concerned with the tendency of population growth to outstrip economic gain and perhaps stimulated by the family planning program inaugurated in Tunisia in 1964, the Moroccan Government since 1965 has cautiously and at times hesitantly developed its own family planning program. A High Council on Population was created in 1966, and family planning centers, where instruction in contraception is given and interuterine devices are inserted without charge, were subsequently established in all urban health clinics. In August 1967, the government abrogated a 1939 law forbidding the advertising or sale of contraceptive devices, and in 1968 the Ministry of Public Health began the distribution of oral contraceptives. In the same year, the family planning program was incorporated into the Five Year Plan (1968-72), and it was subsequently labeled a national priority objective. A project involving the sale of condoms at reduced prices in tobacco stores in Casablanca was initiated in 1969, and a Demographic Research Center was created in 1971.

The primary goal of the family planning program is to inform Moroccans of the various possibilities of limiting family size and of the different contraceptive methods available. Ultimately, the government hopes that the program will effect a reduction in the birth rate, but to date the program, hampered by weak administration and the strong opposition of certain political and religious leaders, has achieved minimal results. In urban areas the basic infrastructure has been established and personnel trained, but rural areas remain largely unaffected. Moreover, no significant effort to educate the population in matters of family planning has yet been undertaken. Sizable segments of the population are still basically apathetic or ignorant about contraceptive methods, particularly in the countryside where few persons are even aware of the government's family planning program. Knowledge of contraceptive practices is more widespread among city residents, but it is by no means universal, and the practice of contraception is extremely low. According to one survey of urban couples, more than 90% had never done anything to prevent conception.

Because births and deaths are grossly underreported in Morocco, it is impossible to determine prevailing birth and death rates accurately. The U.N., however,

has estimated the following vital rates for Morocco for the decades of the 1950's and 1960's:

	Birth rate	Death rate	Rate of natural increase
1950-55	50.4	25.7	24.7
1955-60	50.4	22.7	27.7
1960-65	50.1	19.6	30.5
1965-70	49.5	16.5	33.0

The U.N. estimates for the period 1965-70 are basically in accord with the official estimates of the Moroccan Statistical Service. In 1966, that agency assumed that Morocco had a birth rate of 50 per 1,000 population and a death rate of 17 per 1,000.

As the U.N. estimates indicate, birth and death rates have been declining since 1950. During 1950-70, the birth rate dropped by approximately 2% whereas the death rate decreased by about 56%; the result was rapidly increasing population growth. The rate of natural increase rose by 34% during the 1950-70 period, culminating in a 3.3% annual rate during 1965-70. Emigration, however, served to lower somewhat the average annual rate of growth during the late 1960's.

According to U.N. estimates, life expectancy at birth rose from 42.9 years in 1950-55 to 50.2 years in 1965-70, and has been projected at 56.5 years in 1975-80. Despite the improvement between 1950 and 1970, life expectancy at birth is somewhat lower in Morocco than in any other Maghrebian country.

Because of the uncertainty of future levels of fertility and morality, as well as the magnitude of emigration, it is difficult to predict the level of Morocco's population in the years to come. Observers agree, however, that the current age structure is highly conducive to accelerated population growth in the future and that the population can be expected to continue to grow rapidly during the 1970's and 1980's whether or not the birth rate declines. In fact, the birth rate is likely to continue the very gradual downward trend begun in the 1960's. The death rate has already dropped substantially, but the current level of mortality is sufficiently high to respond positively to improved health conditions, and the death rate probably will continue to fall. In particular, the infant mortality rate, estimated at 145 deaths of children under age 1 per 1,000 live births in 1970, is expected to decline as health conditions gradually improve.

The U.N., in its estimates and projections of the Moroccan population, has assumed that the population will grow by 3.4% per year in 1970-75 and that the rate will increase to 3.5% during 1975-80 before dropping to 3.3% during 1980-85 and to 3.2% during 1985-90. Should these assumptions prove valid, the population would reach 20 million in 1978 and 30 million in 1990. Even at the 2.9% annual growth rate implied for the Moroccan Muslim population in 1960-71, the 1972 population would double in 24 years.

1. Size and distribution

a. Size

According to the preliminary results of the census of 20 July 1971, Morocco had a population of 15,379,259, a 32% increase over the number enumerated in 1960 and a 65% increase over the figure officially estimated for the area in 1952. By midyear 1972, the population had risen to an estimated 15,800,000. Morocco thus ranks as the most populous of the four Maghreb nations. It also has a larger population than any of the other Arab states except Egypt and the Sudan, and it is the seventh most populous country in Africa.

b. Density and distribution

Morocco's population is spread over broad and well-watered coastal plains, in contrast to other countries of the Maghreb, where the population is often concentrated in a fairly narrow coastal belt. Nonetheless, Morocco is the most densely populated country of the Maghreb. With a land area of approximately 158,100 square miles, Morocco had a density of almost 100 persons per square mile at midyear 1972. Its neighbors to the east and south are much less densely populated.

Extreme variation in rainfall and physical geography underlie diverse patterns of settlement, which range from an unsettled nomadic state in the arid southeastern desert area to fairly dense rural settlements and great concentrations of urban population along the fertile Atlantic coast. Intermediate between the desert and seacoast are extensive mountain regions, where settlement patterns range from those of seminomadic pastoral groups at the higher altitudes of the Atlas Mountains to those of settled agriculturalists who crowd the foothills of the Rif mountain chain.

Excluding the areas around Casablanca, Rabat, and Tangier, population density in 1960 ranged from fewer than 10 persons per square mile in districts in the desert and semidesert regions of the southeast to more than 400 in districts in the west and far north (Figure 6). Rural densities as low as 1 per square mile were reported in Tarfaya Province, and as high as 209 in fertile agricultural zones near Marrakech and Rabat. The mountainous regions are generally more densely settled than the arid regions of the southeast. This is especially true in the mountainous areas of northern



FIGURE 6. Population density (U/OU)

Morocco, where population densities in the Rif and its foothills frequently rise to more than 100. Densities of more than 1,000 were recorded in 1960 along the west coast—in Casablanca, Rabat, and Tangier. The most densely settled area in the country is a 90-mile coastal strip from Casablanca northward to Kenitra. A belt of high densities also extends eastward from Rabat through the Taza corridor, which separates the Rif and Atlas mountain chains. In 1971, about 83% of the population of Morocco resided in the northwestern half of the country. The rest lived in the area southeast of a line drawn roughly between Nador in the north and Agadir in the south.

Morocco is still a predominantly rural country, but the proportion of the urban population to the total population has been rising steadily, as shown in the following tabulation:

1926	10%
1936	16%
1952	25%
1960	29%
1971	35%

At current rates of growth, the urban population is expected to constitute 40% of the total population by 1980. The process of urbanization, however, is uneven. Most of the major urban centers are within 100 miles of the Atlantic, primarily in the northwestern quarter of the country; there are no settlements with a population as large as 15,000 in the southeast or in the far south. Moreover, the urban areas witnessing the most rapid growth are those located along the Atlantic coast. Such traditional inland centers of population as Fes and Marrakech, while growing, show a rate of population increase below that of the coastal cities.

During the 1960-71 intercensal period, the urban population increased by 58%, compared with 21% for the rural population. The number of cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants rose from eight to 11, and in 1971 these 11 cities made up 69% of the total urban population. At that time, about half of all urban dwellers lived in Casablanca or in the twin cities of Rabat and Sale. Among the 19 provinces, Tangier had the highest proportion of urban residents, Ouarzazate the lowest (Figure 7). Generally, the northern and

FIGURE 7. Population, by administrative area and urban-rural residence, 1971 (U/OU)

ADMINISTRATIVE AREA	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL	PERCENT URBAN
Province:				
Agadir	170,600	993,028	1,163,628	14.7
Al Hoceima	22,496	224,098	246,594	9.1
Beni Mellal	117,296	542,395	659,691	17.8
El Jadida	92,185	498,738	590,923	15.6
Fes	383,904	687,512	1,071,416	35.8
Kenitra	308,477	1,034,498	1,342,975	23.0
Khouribga	143,170	185,134	328,304	43.6
Ksar es Souk	46,595	424,525	471,120	9.9
Marrakech	393,118	1,159,410	1,552,528	25.3
Meknes	363,499	420,561	784,060	46.4
Nador	44,176	436,341	480,517	9.2
Ouarzazate	29,048	493,328	522,376	5.6
Oudja	315,188	318,640	633,828	49.7
Safi	193,619	704,327	897,946	21.6
Settat	112,947	542,422	655,369	17.2
Tangier	187,894	27,608	215,502	87.2
Tarfaya	11,826	12,335	24,161	48.9
Taza	73,218	501,338	574,556	12.7
Tetouan	278,882	517,396	796,278	35.0
Prefecture:				
Casablanca	1,576,272	149,501	1,725,773	91.3
Rabat-Sale	539,056	102,658	641,714	84.0
All Morocco	5,403,466	9,975,793	15,379,259	35.1

NOTE—Data are based on the preliminary results of the 20 July 1971 census.

western provinces had a much higher proportion of urban residents than the southern and eastern provinces.

By far the largest of Moroccan cities, Casablanca accounts for slightly more than 40% of the total urban population and about 10% of the total population. With a population of 1.5 million in 1971, it was almost three times as large as Rabat-Sale, the second largest urban complex (Figure 8). Increasing largely as the result of migration from the countryside, the population of Casablanca grew at an average annual rate of 4.1% during the 1960-71 period. Overall, the urban population increased at an average annual rate of 4.3% during 1960-71, compared with 1.8% for the rural population.

Moroccan officials have estimated that the net volume of migration to the cities averaged about 30,000 persons per year in the 1936-52 period, rose to 50,000 in 1952-60, and has since increased to about 100,000 migrants annually. Economic factors are the underlying cause of this rural exodus. As a result, cities with the greatest economic potential have been the preferred destinations. These include Casablanca, Kenitra, and Safi, with Casablanca being the prime magnet for rural migrants. Sale is also the destination for many, partly because influx to its cross-river twin city, Rabat, has been zealously blocked by authorities intent on keeping the country's capital free of *bidonvilles* and discernible unemployment.

Morocco's cities have been unable to cope with the number of migrants arriving from the countryside. They have become overcrowded, already inadequate

FIGURE 8. Growth of cities of 100,000 or more inhabitants in 1971 (U/OU)
(Population in thousands)

CITY	POPULATION 1960	POPULATION 1971	AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH, 1960-71
Casablanca	965	1,500	4.1
Rabat	227	375	4.7
Marrakech	243	333	2.9
Fes	216	322	3.7
Meknes	176	248	3.2
Tangier	142	188	2.6
Oudja	129	176	2.9
Sale	29	156	16.5
Kenitra	87	139	4.4
Tetouan	101	139	2.9
Safi	81	129	4.3

services have deteriorated, and urban administration has been aggravated by the heavy burdens caused by the migrants. The Moroccan Government has long sought to check migration from rural areas to urban centers by undertaking programs designed to create a rural counterattraction to the cities. These have involved agricultural development projects, road and school construction, and other economic and social endeavors. An attempt has also been made to round up recent migrants and send them back to their rural homes. Because controls in the urban areas have been effective only periodically and because the rural development schemes have been too limited, the rural exodus has continued more or less unabated.

Although definitive statistical data are not available, some well-defined patterns of recent internal migration are nonetheless apparent. Most migrants to the cities come from rural districts in the southern part of the country, where rainfall is lowest. Specific areas of out-migration occur in the arid and semiarid lands of the Sous and Draa river valleys, and in the vicinities of Tafilalt and Figuig. Mountainous areas have also contributed their share of migrants; these include the dry Anti-Atlas and western High Atlas ranges and the rugged Rif region of the north. Out-migration has also occured in some of the fertile Atlantic plains areas, i.e., Abda, Chaouia, and Doukkala, where the problem is one of too little land and too many people.

2. Age-sex structure

Although age-sex data from the 1971 census are not yet available, Morocco is known to have a very young population. At midyear 1970, according to an official Moroccan estimate, the median age of the Moroccan Muslim population (99% of the total population) was 16.4 years, more than 11 years below that for the United States. Moreover, the figure for 1970 was 2.5 years lower than that ascertained in 1960, pointing up the trend toward an increasingly youthful population that is expected to continue in the near future.

At midyear 1970, almost one-fifth of all Moroccan Muslims were under age 5 and slightly more than 46% were under age 15. At the other extreme, only 2.5% were age 65 or older. All together, 49.2% were in the dependent ages (0-14 and 65 or older), while 50.8% were in the working ages (15-64), providing a ratio of 967 persons in the dependent ages per 1,000 in the working ages, a figure some 57% higher than that in the United States. In such countries as Morocco, however, the formal dependency ratio tends to overstate the actual degree of dependency, as many children under age 15, especially in rural areas, are engaged in some form of work activity, and persons



NOTE: Moroccan Muslim population

FIGURE 9. Age-sex structure, Morocco and the United States, midyear 1970 (U/OU)

age 65 or older are often compelled by economic necessity to continue working.

Morocco's population profile, compared with that of the United States (Figure 9), shows that the proportion of the population under age 5 is more than double that of the United States, attesting to Morocco's much higher level of fertility. In fact, Morocco has a larger proportion of persons in all age groups under 35 than has the United States. Conversely, the proportion of the U.S. population in the middle and older ages is markedly higher than that of Morocco, indicative of the lower level of mortality.

Although more recent data are unavailable, the census of 1960 revealed significant differences in the age composition of the urban and rural Moroccan Muslim population. Children under age 10 comprised a higher proportion of the rural than of the urban population; the proportion of persons age 50 and over was also higher in rural areas than in urban centers. In contrast, persons in the 10-49 age groups constituted a larger proportion of the urban population than of the rural.

According to the official midyear 1970 estimate, there were 99.7 males per 100 females, a figure approximately the same as that determined by the 1960 census. Sex ratios for specific age groups, as revealed by the 1960 census, were erratic (e.g., 95.7 males per 100 females in the 0-4 age group, 145.3 per 100 in the 55-59 age group). However, the sex ratios generated by the official 1970 estimates are also questionable, being inexplicably low in the younger age groups and high in the middle age groups.

As ascertained by the 1960 census, there was a wide range in sex ratios among Morocco's provinces. The sex ratio of the urban population (98.4) was somewhat lower than that (100.5) of the rural population, suggesting that more women than men migrate from rural to urban areas. As a consequence, provinces that contain large urban populations, such as Tangier (96.9) and Oujda (97.8) tended to register lower sex ratios than did those provinces with smaller urban populations, such as Ksar es Souk (100.8) and Taza (100.6). Low ratios also appeared for provinces from which men migrate in search of work elsewhere, such as Agadir (90.3) and Ouarzazate (96.4); higher ratios are shown for provinces containing areas of predominantly male in-migration, such as for Beni Mellal (104.3) and Marrakech (102.3). The very high ratio (111.7) in the southern desert province of Tarfaya suggests that the nomadic way of life there strongly favors men over women.

D. The role of labor (U/OU)

1. The people and work

Most Moroccan workers are subsistence farmers.[2] Subsistence work, however, is not unique to the farmer, since many, if not most, of his urban counterparts hold menial jobs which require less skill and offer little hope for advancement. Although manpower training programs have been introduced, the nation's capacity for human resource development remains grossly inadequate. Thus, the inordinately high dependence on foreign technicians, managers, and professionals can be expected to continue well into the future.

Employment opportunities, even in farming and herding, traditionally the leading occupations, have generally lagged behind the growth in the labor pool. According to official projections released in 1968, it was anticipated that the number of first-job seekers entering the labor force during the years 1968-72 would increase by 3% annually, while job opportunities were expected to grow at 2%. As a result, high unemployment and underemployment are the greatest problems confronting labor. At the beginning of 1971, according to a U.S. Embassy estimate, some 1.2 million workers were unemployed. They comprised 27.8% of the urban and 18.6% of the rural labor force, or 20.9% of the total number of economically active persons. Official Moroccan estimates are substantially lower, amounting to 14%. The higher unemployment rates that prevail in urban areas are a direct result of the migration of farmers, who have found it increasingly difficult to wrest a livelihood in the countryside because of population pressures on the limited supply of arable land. As many as 50% of those who remain in rural areas are underemployed. These include many seasonal agricultural laborers and small landowners who are idle for 125 to 150 days per year. In all fields of economic activity, young persons are especially prevalent within the ranks of the unemployed and underemployed.

Those out of work are usually unemployed for long periods. In 1964, for example, 50% reportedly were unemployed for at least 1 year. The situation in Casablanca is especially critical. A 1958 study, whose conclusions are probably still valid, indicated that one in four was out of work, and an additional 20% worked less than 30 hours per week. Furthermore, of those employed, 62% were reported to be engaged in "unproductive" jobs. However, the social and political effects of unemployment are not as serious in Morocco as in highly industrialized countries. For many receiving assistance from family and friends, idleness has become a way of life; for others, underemployment does not necessarily mean inactivity as they are often occupied with noneconomic pursuits. Leisure, moreover, is highly valued, as many Moroccans scorn manual labor.

The government has undertaken several programs to reduce unemployment. Unskilled workers are encouraged to seek work in Europe, and a few vocational training programs exist, although these are largely ineffective. As of early 1970, it was estimated that some 200,000 Moroccans were employed in Europe, over half of them in France; the number has grown appreciably since that time. Since 1940, legislation has required the compulsory registration of the unemployed with the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Youth, and Sports, which in theory is required to find them jobs. However, not all jobless workers register, and even fewer are actually placed. Furthermore, in order to reduce rural migration, newcomers with less than 6 months' residence in the cities are denied assistance.

The major public works program, *Promotion Nationale* (PN), was established in 1961 in an effort to develop the countryside, create jobs for the unemployed, and stem heavy migration to the cities. Extended to urban areas in 1963, it has since become national in scope. Among its activities, PN provides jobs in village improvement, home construction, reforestation, and roadbuilding projects. Although in 1962 it offered work to about 400,000 persons, the program has since declined. In 1969 and again in 1970, about 100,000 were hired for 200 days, teams of

[2]According to state planners, about 72% of all workers were in agriculture or allied occupations in 1968.

FIGURE 10. Representative working conditions. (*upper left*) Berber potter. (*above*) A metalworker in Fes. Working conditions for most craftsmen are poor. (*left*) As this cannery employee is doing, it is commonplace for working mothers to tend their young on the job. (U/OU)

workers being rotated every 2 weeks to provide work to greater numbers of the unemployed. Remuneration is paid half in wages and half in food.

Labor productivity is low by Western standards largely because of the prevalence of poor working conditions (Figure 10), although malnutrition, ill health, and featherbedding are also responsible. An important seasonal factor is the month-long Ramadan fast which contributes to low productivity. In many sectors, worker absenteeism is low despite the drawbacks mentioned (reportedly only 4% in the metal ore mines); absenteeism, however, runs as high as 30% in the Jerada coal mines.

Productivity is also held down by the large proportion of young, inexperienced workers in the labor force, as well as by the substantial number of elderly workers. Over 36% of all persons ages 15 through [illegible] and nearly two-fifths of those age 65 or older were reported as economically active in 1960. These proportions point up not only the limited educational opportunities for the young and the lack of social insurance programs for large segments of the older population but also the general poverty of the country.

2. Labor legislation

Although a comprehensive labor code does not exist, Morocco possesses a generally advanced set of labor regulations, administered by the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Youth, and Sports. Most of these laws are of French origin or inspiration, and many are unsuited to domestic conditions. In addition, the laws generally reflect an aspiration for improved working conditons rather than a reality, as they are usually observed only in foreign-owned firms and in some of the more modern Moroccan enterprises. The major labor statutes recognize the right of workers to organize, strike, and bargain collectively; establish a minimum wage scale and a 48-hour week; stipulate hiring procedures, work conditions, and health and safety standards for most occupations; protect workers against arbitrary dismissal; provide for the establishment of labor arbitration machinery; require the payment of severance pay; and guarantee compensation for disability resulting from occupational disease or work injury. One of the most important pieces of legislation established the National Social Security Fund (CNSS), the country's major insurance scheme for workers. A draft labor code designed to unite and simplify the country's labor laws, thereby clarifying the nation's work standards, as well as the guidelines which govern relations between workers and management, was completed in 1971, but its current status remains unclear.

The fault for the haphazard enforcement of labor regulations lies, in part, with the workers, many of whom are ignorant of their rights, are apathetic, and fail to demand the working conditions and remuneration required by law. In fact, good working conditions have been known to result from employer and government efforts in the face of worker indifference. Official initiative, however, is not the rule. For one thing, many field personnel of the labor ministry are corrupt. Placement officers frequently require under-the-table sums for locating jobs, and labor inspectors often accept fees from management to overlook illegal practices or conditions. Businesses employing 10 persons or less are not inspected by the government, and their owners or managers are often unaware of the law; rural establishments also generally are neglected. Shopkeepers and the operators of cottage industries often maintain that for financial reasons it is impossible for them to comply with all regulations. Some foreign employers, on the other hand, allege that they are required to maintain higher work standards and that they are inspected more frequently and thoroughly than their domestic counterparts.

It is generally easier for those employed in large establishments, and particularly in foreign-owned firms, to lodge formal grievances. Settlement may occur in a variety of ways. In companies of more than 10 employees, workers are entitled to elect a delegate to present grievances to the management. If agreement is not reached at this stage, government labor inspectors, who often favor the workers, may be called in to negotiate. Failing a settlement at the local level, appeal may be made to a labor court or to a national arbitration commission. Despite constitutional guarantees, the right to strike has been severely limited, particularly during the 1965-70 state of emergency. When strikes do occur, the government encourages strikebreaking, lockouts, and the dismissal of unruly worker delegates and shop stewards, particularly those affiliated with opposition labor groups. According to U.S. Embassy officials, government and management tend to rely on repressive antistrike action rather than on negotiation or collective bargaining. During the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the subsequent antigovernment campaign initiated by the country's largest labor confederation, a number of workers in the private sector were dismissed for union activities or for political agitation. In the course of the prolonged Khouribga miners' strike in 1968, the government cut off utilities in the miners' villages and threatened to discharge all strikers.

Minimum wage rates, established and adjusted by a commission of prices and wages, apply to all wage earners except government workers but vary according to sex and age. On the average, minimum wages for women are 10% to 15% lower than those for men, while minimum wages among youngsters age 14 to 17 are 10% to 45% lower than those for adults. A uniform minimum wage was instituted in November 1971, replacing a system of regional wages. Prior to its enactment, actual wages in urban areas were higher than the established minimum rates, and foreign employers usually paid more than Moroccans for the same kind of labor.

In commerce and industry, the basic workweek is 48 hours with 1 day of rest; overtime rates are paid for more than 48 hours. A few companies observe the 40-hour week. Some workers, however, are said to work over 12 hours per day, and in 1968, railroad workers reportedly demanded a reduction of the workweek from 68 hours to 44 hours. In agriculture, the legal maximum is 10 hours per day and 2,700 hours per year, but these regulations are not well enforced. Child labor is prohibited except in family enterprises. Nonetheless, the minimum working age is low—12 years for farm workers and 14 years for industrial laborers.

3. Labor and management

Urban trade guilds were among the earliest and most significant organizations to be formed in an otherwise undifferentiated, tradition-bound society. As of the early 1970's, although the major labor organizations were in a state of decline as the result of internal factionalism and confrontations with the government, trade unionism retained some importance as an economic, political, and social force, especially in Casablanca, where industrial workers are concentrated. Moreover, labor unrest has been increasing. The largest and most effective unions are linked to opposition political parties. Conversely, the progovernment Federation of Moroccan Trade Unions of Free Workers (*Union des Syndicats des Travailleurs Libres*), as well as two government-sponsored entities, the Union of Autonomous Moroccan Workers (*Union Marocaine de Travail Autonome*) and the Union of Moroccan Workers (*Union des Travailleurs Marocains*), play insignificant roles in the labor movement.

Although the General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM), an Istiqlal Party affiliate formed in 1960, claims a membership of 25,000, this figure is probably inflated. The Moroccan Labor Union (UMT) is the country's largest labor confederation. Once a powerful political force, its membership had fallen from 650,000 shortly after its founding in 1955 to perhaps 200,000. The reduction in UMT membership can perhaps be ascribed to the organization's inability to secure many of its economic and social objectives, whether in the field of higher salaries or better working conditions; additionally, government intimidation and the threat of unemployment have made the workers generally submissive. The confederation is plagued by factionalism, personal rivalries among the top leadership, and the disaffection of young militants, including some who demand that the organization be administered along more democratic lines. These factors, coupled with difficulties encountered in the collection of membership dues, have hampered the UMT's effectiveness. Thus, member workers have been known to engage in wildcat strikes and to reject agreements drawn by their leaders and management. Whatever measure of success is enjoyed by the UMT results in part from its ability to provide a pseudokinship environment for urban workers recently displaced from land and tribe. In hopes of developing professionalism and a greater commitment to the labor movement among union leaders, the UMT operates the Permanent Trade Union School, which has a small capacity. The Moroccan Working Youth Organization (JOM), the youth branch of the UMT, has been practically inactive for a number of years.

Because of its problems of internal organization, UMT control over its constituent elements has tended to weaken. Consisting of some 26 national industrial and craft groupings, the confederation comprises approximately 47 local affiliates. These include unions of miners, teachers, communications workers, bank employees, grocery workers, dock workers, busdrivers, and leatherworkers. Each year union members usually elect a representative to the UMT; he may also be empowered to discuss grievances or problems with management. Rural agricultural labor is not prominently represented in the UMT or in any other labor organization, and government employees have not been organized since the UMT's *Union des Syndicats Fonctionnaires* was dissolved in the mid-1960's.

Despite its dwindling membership and lack of vitality, the UMT remains potentially one of the government's strongest opponents. The formal link that existed initially between the confederation and the leftwing National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) was severed in 1962, only to be reestablished during the early 1970's and broken again in 1972. Even during the periods of separation, however, the government tends to regard UMT positions and demands as political challenges, a view that is not altogether unfounded since the bulk of UNFP rank and file support derived, then as now, from confederation members. UMT leaders, moreover, have consistently opposed the government's economic and foreign policies, and the monarchy itself has been the object of vitriolic attack.

While the UMT has exchanged trade union information and personnel with a number of counterpart groups in socialist and Communist states, as well as with the World Federation of Trade Unions, the organization has generally barred Marxist influence and has confined its international affiliations to regional groups. A member of the All-African Trade Union Federation, the UMT is also represented in the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and hosted the first conference of the International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with the Workers and People of Palestine.

Entrepreneurs and employers belong to some of the most notable organizations in the modern sector of national life. Organized at the local and national levels, such groups represent the interests of businessmen and management before the government, explain government policies to their members, and to a limited extent lobby for their corporate interests. The National Federation of Chambers of Commerce of Morocco (*Federation Nationale des Chambres de Commerce du Maroc*), one of the leading organiza-

tions of this type, has attempted to serve as the national voice of Moroccan business. Junior chambers of commerce, located in a number of cities, have undertaken, among other projects, to administer a junior executive training program.

Other business organizations include the General Economic Confederation of Morocco (*Confederation Generale Economique Marocaine*), a major employers' association composed mainly of Frenchmen, and the Istiqlal-affiliated Moroccan Union of Commerce, Industry, and Handicrafts (UMCIA). Created in 1956, the UMCIA once claimed about 170,000 members in 650 local units, but it has been inactive, if not legally defunct, since 1962. The Moroccan Farmers Union (UMA), a conservative farm organization created shortly after independence, was once a comparatively effective pressure group, essentially representing the interests of large landowners. In 1961, the UMT established the Trade Union of Agriculture (*Union Syndicale de l'Agriculture*) to organize farm workers, as opposed to the landowners represented by the UMA; both organizations, however, like the UMCIA, are probably inactive.

E. Living conditions and social problems (U/OU)

1. Levels of living

While a small minority of Moroccans live quite well and a still smaller group, the affluent, enjoy a level of living comparable with that of their counterparts in Europe, most of the population are poverty-stricken, undernourished, ill housed, and prone to disease. Many are underemployed or out of work; few have access to adequate social services. No more than 10% of the population have been integrated into the modern consumer society, and per capita income is the lowest in the Maghreb.

Since independence the economy has tended to stagnate, despite the employment of substantial numbers of French technicians and the receipt of large amounts of foreign aid. Although the gross national product has risen slowly, population growth has absorbed most of the gain. Moreover, distribution of national income is marked by extremes of wealth and poverty. The gap between rich and poor is most obvious in the urban centers, where opulent displays of wealth characterize a few families, and slum conditions are wretched; it is less evident in rural areas, where almost everyone is poor. As a result of a pattern of land ownership said to be the least equitable in north Africa, most rural dwellers live on small holdings, eking out a marginal existence through subsistence farming or herding, sometimes supplemented by handicrafts or other nonindustrial pursuits. According to a 1964 study, the landholdings of 40% of all families engaged in agriculture were so small as to constitute an insignificant proportion of the total land under cultivation. In 1967, according to official estimates, a typical rural household of five members earned the equivalent of US$160 per year, or a per capita average of $32—about $150 less than the national average.

Wage earners in rural areas, primarily agricultural laborers, are paid much less than urban workers. In 1970, farmworkers earned DH2 to DH4 per day, supplementing their income with whatever they could cultivate for home consumption. (At that time 5.06 dirhams = US$1.) In the same year, 15% of the urban work force were paid DH500 or more per month; 35% earned DH200 to DH500, and 50% earned less than DH200. The average amounted to about DH270 monthly. In 1964, roughly 3.8% of Casablanca's labor force, or some 9,300 persons, reportedly had a monthly income of more than DH1,000, but it was estimated that almost as many Casablancans were engaged in begging for a living.

Private sector wages generally have failed to match the rise in the cost of living. Prior to the 12% to 29% raise granted in November 1971, there had been no increase in the minimum wage since 1962. As of November 1971, the minimum wage in industry and commerce was DH0.956 per hour; in agriculture it was DH5 per day. In Casablanca, however, hourly wages are considerably higher than the minimum, ranging from DH1.08 for an unskilled municipal laborer to DH5.34 for an electric utility linesman. Except for certain categories of skilled workers, remuneration in the public sector was maintained at the same levels from 1956 until 1970, when teachers received salary increases ranging from 20% to 60%. In July 1971, military personnel and civilian employees of the government were finally given a 15% increase in their basic pay. According to some observers, the 1956-71 wage freeze for this sector of the labor force has been at least partly responsible for widespread corruption and low-quality performance in the civil service.

While wages and salaries remained generally fixed throughout the 1960's, living costs climbed steadily, thereby creating a substantial gap between income and expenditure among wage-earning consumers. A cost-of-living index for the city of Casablanca indicates that prices rose by more than 37% in the 1959-71 period. Prices for clothing increased most during the period, followed by food prices. The cost of housing advanced least. The government has

attempted to impose some control over prices of staple foods and clothing ("goods of prime necessity") and has undertaken periodic anti-inflation campaigns, but with little success. A new price control policy is reported to be under consideration. Meanwhile, the labor unions are becoming more vocal in their demands for wage increases that will keep pace with the rising cost of living.

Little information is available on disposal of monetary income. The only national survey on consumption expenditures, taken in 1959-60, revealed that urban households devoted 60% of their total income to food; the proportion for rural households was 76.4% (Figure 11). Rent was not a factor in rural areas, but it accounted for 11.2% of the total expenditures of urban households.

The condition of existing housing stock points up the plight of the country's low-income and subsistence groups. The housing situation is critical: overcrowding is common, amenities are few, and urban slums are proliferating. Land speculation in the cities has made it difficult to build low-cost dwellings; new housing is well beyond the reach of all but the affluent. Information on the housing stock is restricted chiefly to that derived from the 1960 census. At the time of the census, 2,409,750 dwelling units were identified, 787,450 in urban centers and 1,622,300 in rural areas. Of the total units, 23.6% (71.6% in urban, areas 5.1% in rural areas) were classified as permanent, conventional dwellings; the rest were categorized as "rustic, improvised, or not intended for habitation." Housing amenities were recorded only for the permanent, conventional dwellings. Of such units, 51.9% (58.7% urban, 19.0% rural) had piped water either in the dwelling or in the yard; 88.7% (92.5% urban, 69.9% rural) had some form of toilet facility; 19.7% (21.5% urban, 10.5% rural) had a fixed bath or shower; and 76.1% (85.4% urban, 30.8% rural) had electricity. A majority of conventional housing units contained no more than two rooms, and only 10% had more than four; the average number of rooms was 2.6. The average number of persons per room was 2.1 for the urban dwellings and 2.3 for the rural dwellings. Presumably most units classified as "rustic, improvised, or not intended for habitation" had few, if any, amenities, and overcrowding was perhaps even more pronounced than in the conventional housing.

FIGURE 11. Household expenditures, by major item, 1959-60 (U/OU)
(Percent of total expenditure)

ITEM OF EXPENDITURE	URBAN HOUSEHOLDS	RURAL HOUSEHOLDS
Food	60.0	76.4
Rent	11.2	...
Clothing	7.6	8.1
Fuel and electricity	5.3	2.1
Household equipment, operation, etc.	8.5	4.5
Miscellaneous	12.4	8.9
All items	100.0	100.0

... Not pertinent.

Although post-1960 quantitative data on housing are not available, it is generally agreed that conditions have deteriorated since 1960. In 1970, Moroccan officials, while noting a slight trend in rural areas toward more substantial, permanent-type dwellings, reported that the bulk of the rural population continued to live in "decrepit, delapidated, or ruined" housing (Figure 12). They also commented on the proliferation of substandard urban dwellings, specifically the hovels in the old *madinahs* and the shacks in the *bidonvilles*, the makeshift communities sheltering squatters in the urban centers. Since the 1930's, ever-growing numbers of rural people have been moving to the cities in search of a better life. Unskilled, illiterate, and often unable to find jobs, these rural migrants frequently live in conditions that are worse than those they left in the countryside, huddled in *bidonville* huts put together from any materials at hand (Figure 13). In stark contrast, many of the wealthy families in the cities live in sumptuous homes (Figure 14).

In 1961, the Ministry of Interior instituted a program to remove unemployed residents from city slums and return them to their native villages, but it has had slight effect. Relocation efforts within urban centers have been similarly unsuccessful. Of 150,000 families living in the nation's *bidonvilles* in 1965, only 14.7% had been relocated by the end of 1967. In all of the cities the growth of slums is virtually uncontrolled. Although the need for low-cost dwelling units is desperate, government efforts to increase the housing supply have been sporadic and underfinanced. In the 12-year period from 1956 to 1968, only 40,900 low-cost units were built. Under the 1968-72 Five Year Plan, DH8.5 million (now about US$1.8 million) per year was allocated to housing, with the emphasis placed on improving the situation in rural areas in an effort to slow migration to the cities. The plan provided for the building of 60,000 new rural dwellings and the upgrading of 30,000 existing units. No specific information is available concerning implementation.



FIGURE 12. Examples of rural housing (U/OU)

Among certain groups the government is a frequent target of criticism stemming from the lack of social and economic development and the depressed condition of the masses. Opposition political parties, particularly the Istiqlal and the UNFP, cite the large-scale unemployment, high prices, low wages, poor housing, and widespread poverty as evidence of the government's inability or unwillingness to confront the country's problems. Party leaders criticize the government specifically for failing to repossess all European-owned land and accuse it of distributing sequestered holdings to wealthy absentee landlords, thereby increasing the wealth of the rich and perpetuating the grossly unequal income distribution. The tone of the opposition charges, however, does not reflect a general state of social unrest. Although many of the unemployed, Western-educated youth in the cities bitterly resent their plight and could conceivably be regarded as a potential threat to the future stability of the nation, little resentment is evident among the majority of the population who have had little exposure to the amenities of modern life and are apparently more or less resigned to the low levels of living which they must endure.

Since the coup attempt against the King in July 1971, the government appears to be addressing itself more assiduously to improving the lot of the people, its stated objective being to reduce the gap between rich and poor and provide decent living conditions for all. One effort has involved an acceleration of land reform (see The Economy chapter, under Agriculture). Another advance, introduced at the beginning of 1972, is a change in the tax structure, attempting to shift the burden to those most able to bear it and abolishing taxes on some consumer items. In addition, the next Five Year Plan (1973-77) looks toward government investment in job-creating enterprises, expanded health and welfare services, and increased funding for the educational system and for social insurance programs. A massive project for new housing construction is also planned. The scarcity of financial resources is a major obstacle to implementation of

FIGURE 13. *Bidonville* dwellings, Casablanca. These shanties are made of whatever materials are available, including pieces of lumber, cardboard, corrugated iron, and flattened gasoline drums. Density is high in the shantytowns; as many as 500 persons live on a single acre of ground in some areas. (C)

such measures, and extensive reliance on foreign aid is anticipated. Major contributors to Moroccan socioeconomic development programs in the past have been France, the United States, and various U.N. agencies.

2. Social services

According to traditional practice, the indigent, the elderly, the disabled, and the sick, as well as orphans and widows, are the responsibility of the immediate family or, if necessary, more distant relatives. The obligations and institutions of Islam have also been a significant source of aid to those in need. One of the "five pillars of Islam" makes it incumbent upon believers to give alms to the poor, and this is commonly observed among those who can afford it. In addition, mosque officials frequently dispense food and provide shelter to indigents. The *habous* (religious endowments) system has disbursed substantial funds for welfare in the past, but it is of little significance today. Limited social services are provided by various agencies, both public and private. These are centered largely in the cities, however, and are of little help to the rural population.

In the modern sector of society, French-inspired social insurance programs offer old age, invalidity, and death benefits, sickness and maternity benefits, family allowances, and work injury compensation to a small segment of the labor force. Most insured employees are unionized workers, three-fourths of whom are reported to live in Casablanca. In addition to these programs, there is a special insurance system for civil servants. All of the social insurance programs, except the one applying to work injury, are administered by the National Social Security Fund (CNSS), which operates under the general supervision of the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Youth, and Sports. Operating funds are derived from the contributions of employers and employees and are apparently inadequate. Reportedly, the CNSS has many financial problems.



FIGURE 14. Home of an upper class family, Casablanca. European-style villas and modern apartments house the affluent of the cities. (U/OU)

Although the number of workers involved in the CNSS system has been rising—from 226,000 at the beginning of 1967 to 273,000 at the beginning of 1970—coverage remains highly restricted, applying only to employees in industry, commerce, and cooperatives. Specifically excluded are agricultural laborers, domestics, employees of the railroads, and all part-time workers. Employees covered at the beginning of 1970 represented only about 5% of the total labor force.

Under the old-age, invalidity, and death program, for which employees contribute 2.5% of earnings and employers 5% of payroll, those with 180 months of contributions are eligible for a retirement pension at age 60. The minimum pension amounts to 20% of average earnings during the 3 years prior to retirement, and it is increased for each 12 months of contributions beyond 180, up to a maximum of 40%. The invalidity pension is payable upon total loss of earning capacity to those with at least 60 months of contributions. Benefits range from a minimum of 20% of earnings for the 3 years prior to loss of capacity to a maximum of 40%, depending upon length of coverage. Widows of covered employees are entitled to a pension equal to 50% of that payable, or potentially payable, to the insured; each surviving orphan under age 12 is entitled to a payment equal to 25% of the pension.

Contributions to the old age, invalidity, and death insurance program also cover sickness and maternity benefits. Covered workers who become ill are eligible for a cash allowance of 50% of earnings, beginning on the seventh day of incapacity and continuing up to 26 weeks in any 12-month period. To be eligible, workers must have had 54 days of contributions during the 4 months prior to incapacitation. To be eligible for the maternity benefit, 108 days of contributions during the 10 months preceding confinement are required. The benefit, payable for up to 10 weeks (including not more than 6 weeks before nor more than 8 weeks after confinement) amounts to 50% of earnings. No medical benefits are provided for either sickness or maternity cases.

The family allowance program authorizes an allowance of DH24 per month for a second child and each additional child, through the sixth, to parents who have had 108 days of contributions to the system during the 6 months prior to the birth and current earnings of at least DH80 per month. Allowances, paid only for children under age 12 (or age 21 if the child is in school or an invalid), are customarily remitted directly to the employee by the employer, who is reimbursed by the CNSS. This program is financed entirely by employers, who are required to make a contribution of 8% of payroll to cover the costs.

The work injury program is supervised by the Work Accident Service of the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Youth, and Sports. It is financed by employers through direct provision of benefits or through liability insurance which the employer may carry with private insurance companies. For covered workers, the benefit for temporary disability is fixed at 50% of base pay during the first 28 days of disability and at two-thirds of base pay thereafter until recovery or certification of permanent disability. No minimum qualifying period is required. For permanent disability, the benefit, based on earnings, is governed by the degree of disability. Medical benefits and nursing care are also authorized, if necessary. In the case of work-related death, the employer is liable for the cost of the funeral. Survivors' pensions are also prescribed, a widow's pension being equal to 30% of the earnings of the insured if under age 60, 50% if age 60 or over. Each surviving orphan under age 16 (under age 21 if in school or an invalid) is also granted a pension.

In addition to the social insurance programs, certain welfare activities are carried on by a few government agencies. For example, the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Youth, and Sports operates youth centers as well as training centers for delinquent children, and in Casablanca the Division of Social, Legal, and Cultural Affairs sponsors two orphanages and a home for the aged. National Aid (EN), a quasi-official body with a central office in Rabat and liaison offices in the provinces, subsidizes and coordinates various welfare activities. Its chief function is to distribute food, clothing, and fuel to the poor. To qualify for aid, men must be over 60 years of age and women must be

elderly, widowed, or divorced mothers of children. In Casablanca in 1968, more than 100,000 persons were registered with EN and eligible for assistance.

A number of private, specialized organizations, many of them founded by the French but now administered by Moroccans, provide social services. Prominent among these is the League for the Protection of Children and for Health Education, which operates dispensaries, nursery schools, and training centers in several cities. Other national agencies include the Antituberculosis League, the League for Assistance to the Blind, the League for Assistance to Persons Disabled by Toxic Oils, Aid to Orphans of Resistance Fighters, and the Red Crescent Society (the Muslim equivalent of the Red Cross). Created in 1959, the Red Crescent distributes food and clothing to the needy and maintains dispensaries throughout the country. Additional welfare services are provided by various French groups, the Roman Catholic Church, international Jewish organizations, and U.N. agencies, particularly the United Nations Children's Fund.

3. Social problems

Certain factors which are affecting the traditional fabric of Moroccan society are also combining to augment social problems, especially in the cities. Rapid urbanization, unemployment, and the resulting slum conditions in which a large proportion of the urban population live are fostering a rise in such social ills as crime and juvenile delinquency. Theft is the most common crime, but as of 1972 there was concern among authorities over the increase in armed robbery and other acts of violence, including rape. The port area of Casablanca, in particular, is characterized by widespread disorder. Roving gangs of teenage youth are often held responsible for criminal acts, as well as misdemeanors, and in an effort to curb delinquency the government is encouraging urban parents to send their children to the youth centers maintained by the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Youth, and Sports. Crime in the countryside stems mostly from family or tribal disputes, vengeance being the usual motive.

Prostitution, permitted during the protectorate period but declared illegal after independence, is reportedly increasing at a rapid rate not only in the large cities but also in the smaller towns. It is practiced for the most part by widowed or divorced women who are unable to find jobs. Although prostitution is organized in some urban centers, most of the women who practice it conduct business on an individual basis. In 1972, about 15,000 prostitutes were reported to be active in Rabat alone.

Drug addiction is said to be a serious problem, particularly in the Rif, which is the principal region for producing kif, a product of the cannabis plant. Hashish is derived from refining kif. The production and sale of kif is forbidden except under certain restricted conditions, but in some areas it is the most important crop and is handled openly. The number of Moroccans who use hashish, either regularly or occasionally, is estimated at about 1 million.

Because Islam prohibits the consumption of spirits, alcoholism has not been a major concern in the country. Nevertheless, public drunkenness is reported to be increasing in the cities, chiefly among the young.

F. Health (U/OU)

The general level of health in Morocco is low. Deficient diets, substandard living conditions, contaminated water supplies, rudimentary or nonexistent sanitation services, and insufficient medical personnel and facilities all contribute to a high incidence of disease. Wide disparities in the availability of medical care and sanitary facilities exist between the rich and poor segments of the population, between urban and rural areas, and between regions. Although Morocco has a fairly well developed public health infrastructure dating from the establishment of a Public Health Service (now the Ministry of Health) by the French in 1926, the Atlantic coast and northwest provinces have been favored at the expense of those in the northeast, east, and far south. Moreover, government expenditures on health in Morocco are among the lowest in north Africa. In 1971, the proportion of the total operating budget devoted to health was 7.8%, having declined from 9.5% in 1969. A number of health programs are assisted by foreign countries under bilaterial contracts, and by such international agencies as the World Health Organization and the U.N. Children's Fund.

While the nation's climate is generally healthful, the region is hospitable to vectors and parasites. The Atlantic coastal marshes serve as a breeding ground for vectors, and an abundance of flies in this and other areas contributes to the prevalence of trachoma, conjunctivitis, and gastroenteric infections (Figure 15). Trachoma is a major public health problem, despite efforts to control it; virtually all residents of southern Morocco are said to have contracted it at one time or another. Such communicable diseases as schistosomiasis, typhoid and paratyphoid fevers, and diphtheria are also common, as are tuberculosis (with an estimated 50,000 new cases per year), malaria, shigellosis, typhus, influenza, and parasitic infections.

FIGURE 15. Scene at a Koranic school near Erfoud. It is estimated that 50% of the population of that area suffers from trachoma, a disease carried by flies. (U/OU)

Gastrointestinal disorders, in particular, are a prime cause of infant and child mortality. Occasional outbreaks of smallpox still occur, but it is generally under control. Venereal diseases are widespread in some areas.

The high incidence of disease is frequently related to dietary deficiencies which lower resistance to illness. Although the caloric intake for most Moroccans is fairly substantial, an estimated 20% of the population, largely women and children, consume an inadequate amount of food. Shortages are most common in the city slums and in mountain and desert areas. Even among the majority, moreover, consumption of high protein foods is limited, resulting in large-scale malnutrition. Diseases related to dietary problems include rickets, pellagra, goiter, xerophthalmia, anemia, and kwashiorkor.

Food consumption varies widely according to family income and region. In 1964, daily per capita caloric intake, according to one study, ranged from 3,058 calories among high income rural inhabitants to 1,499 calories among low income urban residents, the average being 2,241. Another study, using 1959-60 data, reported the average caloric intake of urban dwellers at 2,094 and that of rural Moroccans at 2,204. However, the intake ranged from a low of 800 among the poorest inhabitants to about 4,600 among some of the wealthiest. Cereals reportedly accounted for an average of 63.6% of total intake; sugar, 14.2%; fats and oils, 6.4%; vegetables, 5.0%; dairy products, 4.2%; meats, 3.3%; and fruits, 3.3%.

The typical diet, based on cereal grains, is monotonous. It is also high in carbohydrates and low in animal proteins and vitamins. Barley and wheat are the chief sources of carbohydrates, but corn is used when other cereals are unavailable. Large quantities of cereals and other foods have had to be imported. Bread is a main staple. Many Moroccans live on bread and vegetables, supplemented by fruits in season. The vegetables include potatoes, tomatoes, turnips, onions, carrots, and squash; most legumes are exported. Inhabitants of the southern oases eat large quantities of dates—as much as 200 to 300 pounds annually per capita. Olive and peanut oil are commonly used in cooking; salt is employed sparingly, which many contribute to the incidence of goiter. A large amount of sugar is consumed, particularly in mint tea, the heavily sweetened national drink. Meat, which is often in short supply, is too expensive to be eaten regularly by the majority. An estimated 50% of the population go without meat or consume it only several times a year, usually on feast days. Except in certain coastal areas, the consumption of fish is also low, despite government campaigns to promote its use. Milk is not consumed regularly except among goatherders.

In order to supplement the submarginal diet of the poorest rural residents, the Ministry of Health operates milk distribution centers in the countryside. It also sponsors an informational program designed to improve public awareness of the importance of a balanced diet and to promote the efficient use of funds spent for food. A school lunch program, intended to advance nutritional levels of children, was begun in 1958; by 1970 it was reaching 170,000 primary school children, or about 15.6% of those enrolled in public primary schools. The nutritional value of the lunches is fairly limited because they consist largely of cereal foods.

Food distribution methods are poor throughout the country, refrigeration is inadequate where it exists at all, and spoilage is common. Also, food handling in much of Morocco is unsanitary. Although the slaughter of animals is theoretically regulated by the government, inspection of slaughterhouses is haphazard, and the system breaks down completely prior to major feast days when large numbers of



FIGURE 16. Meat market, Khemisset. Meat and other foods are usually marketed at outdoor stalls where they are exposed to dirt and insects and are handled by prospective customers. (U/OU)

animals are killed. Meat and other foods are commonly displayed at outdoor street markets which attract swarms of flies and other disease-bearing insects (Figure 16). The situation is made more difficult by the fact that most of the population is apathetic toward developing proper sanitation practices. Personal cleanliness, in fact, is not highly valued; many people are infested with lice and fleas. Some observers report, however, that the dwellings of devout Muslims are thoroughly cleaned before feast days, which are numerous.

Water supply is a serious problem in Morocco. While water is generally abundant in the northwestern region and adequate in the central Atlas, it is scarce in the desert areas of the south and east. Cisterns, wells, and springs are the customary sources of water in the countryside, and these are frequently contaminated. Piped water is available in the principal cities and towns, either to individual homes or to public fountains or taps in the old quarters (Figure 17); however, most municipal systems are inadequate and frequent pollution results from the seepage of sewage into the water mains. Urban water treatment plants exist but are handicapped by a lack of trained personnel and a shortage of chemicals. In some cities, water peddlers are still active.

Regular garbage collection is adequate only in the main business districts and modern quarters of the larger cities. In the poorer urban neighborhoods and in rural areas garbage is dumped indiscriminately or fed to livestock. Similarly, sewerage systems exist only in a few urban sectors, where household toilet facilities are limited to the affluent; some towns maintain public latrines. In the *madinahs*, human waste is usually dumped into the street or collected in courtyard pits. In most rural areas people relieve themselves in the fields or in streams, and throughout the country large quantities of raw sewage are discharged into the closest body of water, resulting in serious water pollution. The general lack of environmental sanitation in Morocco is one of the most serious health hazards.



FIGURE 17. Public water fountain in one of the *madinahs*. Fountains and neighborhood taps are the principal sources of water for the urban poor. (U/OU)

Since independence, the availability of health care has increased, and free medical service, in theory, is provided to those in need. Nevertheless, most Moroccans still receive either minimal or no medical attention. The Ministry of Health formulates and executes national health policies, supervising a Provincial Health Service which operates mainly through district health centers and dispensaries. Limited funding, a serious shortage of personnel, and inadequate equipment hamper the effectiveness of all public health services.

Urban health facilities are generally better than those in the countryside but are often understaffed and inadequate to meet demand. In 1971, there were 38 general and 38 specialized hospitals in the country. Although the total number of hospital beds reportedly had increased from 19,828 at the end of 1964 to more than 24,000 at the beginning of 1971, the ratio of beds to population remained essentially unchanged at approximately 1.5 per 1,000 population. A "major" hospital is located in each provincial capital and in certain other important provincial towns. The remaining "rural" hospitals have limited facilities; most maintain fewer than 50 beds, and some are little more than casualty stations, without surgical equipment and sometimes lacking a qualified physician.

The bulk of the medical care available in rural areas is delivered through health centers and dispensaries. The former offer diagnosis and treatment under the supervision of a general practitioner while the latter deal with minor illnesses. Health centers also serve as headquarters for government-sponsored health education campaigns. Medical personnel operating from a center make regular visits to households within reach in order to provide general instruction in health and hygiene, to give limited medical treatment or first aid, and to collect vital statistics. Between 1964 and 1971, the number of health centers increased by only three, the total rising from 170 to 173; in the same period, the number of dispensaries rose from 502 to 603. It has been estimated that more than 300 health centers and 1,000 dispensaries would be required to serve the needs of the population adequately. Mobile health units provide some medical assistance to remote rural districts; 17 of these were reported to be in use in 1971. In addition to the facilities mentioned above, there are a number of maternal and child care clinics. First established under the protectorate, the clinics offer free prenatal and postnatal care as well as supplementary feeding programs.

Prior to independence, almost all medical personnel in Morocco were Europeans, mainly French, most of whom left the country after 1956. The first native physicians did not enter practice until 1962, and the first Moroccan-trained physicians graduated only in 1968. After being licensed, doctors are required to spend 2 years in the public health service, but most establish more lucrative private practices thereafter. As of January 1971, approximately 1,282 physicians were practicing, an increase since 1967 and of 50 since 1970. National figure represented one physician per inhabitants. Of the total number of physicians [illegible]2, or slightly less than half, were engaged in private practice, concentrated in urban areas and treating but 5% of the total population. In addition responsibility for the medical care of the population was thrust upon the remaining 650 doctors of the public health service. As an example of the critical shortage, in 1970 there were reported to be only 12 physicians available to serve the more than 600,000 residents of Beni Mellal Province. Auxiliary health personnel are also in short supply. Statistics for 1968 indicate that at that time Morocco had a total of 1,066 trained nurses, 216 midwives, and 329 pharmacists. In the same year there were 161 dentists in the country, of whom only 15 were engaged in public service. Professional competence varies from fair to good. It is understood that a number of medical and paramedical personnel from France, Spain, Denmark, Bulgaria, Poland, and Yugoslavia serve in Morocco under contract to the government.

Because of the limited funds available and the urgent need for medical staff, the Ministry of Health has concentrated on training personnel rather than on expanding health care facilities. A 6-year Faculty of Medicine was established at Mohamed V University in Rabat in 1962, and by 1972 it was expected to graduate about 100 physicians per year; many Moroccans also study medicine abroad. Several schools in Morocco offer a 2-year course of instruction in nursing, and a number of institutions train "health assistants" who are capable of providing simple health services in the absence of qualified professional staff. In 1971, medical assistants of this kind numbered 6,460. There are no schools of dentistry or pharmacy in the country. The one medical research facility of note is the Pasteur Institute, which has laboratories in Marrakech, Oujda, Rabat, Tangier, and Tit Mellil (a Casablanca suburb). Staffed mainly by French personnel, the institute conducts basic research in preventive medicine and in animal diseases and prepares serums for the Ministry of Public Health.

In the past, Morocco imported most of its drugs and other medical supplies from European countries,

chiefly France. A domestic pharmaceutical industry has been developing, however, and with the opening of a large pharmaceutical plant in April 1972 many of the country's drug needs will be supplied within the country. Morocco still has limited capability for meeting its needs in blood and blood products. A National Transfusion Center is located at Rabat, a regional center at Casablanca, and collection points at Agadir, Essaoui a, Fes, Kenitra, Marrakech, Meknes, Oujda, Safi, and Tangier.

Modern medicine appears to be generally acceptable to those Moroccans who have access to it. Many women are afraid to go to a hospital for treatment, however, and are reluctant to be attended by men. On the other hand, Moroccan males traditionally have disapproved of female nurses, although acceptance seems to be increasing. At all levels of society, folk remedies are prevalent, and superstitious practices persist. This is particularly true in rural areas, where preventive and curative rites and potions are commonly administered by holy men and local "curers."

G. Religion (U/OU)

Morocco's history during the last 1,200 years has been intimately associated with the development of Islam. To a large extent, Islam has shaped the society's political and economic institutions and determined its social relationships and values. It has also imposed a certain unity on the country and was a major obstacle to intervention and cultural penetration by European powers. Islam is the religion of almost all Moroccans. The only non-Muslims in the country in 1971 were approximately 175,000 Roman Catholics, most of them foreigners; a few thousand Protestants; and about 31,000 Jews.

Until the 20th century, Moroccans possessed an unquestioning faith in their religion, and an individual's personal identity was inseparable from his identity as a Muslim. Today, the requirements of economic and social development are engendering a certain amount of secularization in national life, and some Moroccans are concerned about the future of Islam in their country. The extent of religious decline, however, has been somewhat exaggerated. While indifference to religion is notable among urban intellectuals and workers whose exposure to European life has diluted spiritual concerns, religious values are fading slowly if at all in rural areas (Figure 18).

Although almost all Moroccans became Muslims after Islam was introduced to north Africa by conquering armies and marauding tribes from the Middle East in the seventh century, there was marked difference in the effect of this conversion on the urban and rural sectors of the population. The urban communities assimilated the classical Islamic theological and social patterns of the Middle East; that is, they accepted orthodox Islam, while the peasants and tribesmen accepted the name of Islam but little of its orthodox content. The religion of the latter groups, known as popular or folk Islam, retained many traditional beliefs and practices under the veneer of a few Arabic Islamic formalities. The average unschooled Moroccan is not fully cognizant of the Koran, Islam's sacred book, or of Muslim law, the Sharia. Many Berbers view the Sharia as an alien urban code and prefer to adhere to their own customary law. No matter how orthodox, folk Islam nevertheless still regulates most aspects of life for the rural population and for that part of the urban lower class composed of new migrants from the countryside. Among the traditionally orthodox sectors of the urban population, on the other hand, the hold of religion is undeniably waning. Urban workers are becoming increasingly secularized, and there is a steadily growing minority among the educated elite whose close contact with Western thought and attitudes leads them to deal with the dogma of orthodox Islam as a set of inspired principles subject to individual and rational intepretation; these Moroccans try to assimilate Islamic principles into Western thought. It is believed that most Moroccan nationalists belong this latter group. The variations in belief and practice notwithstanding, the Islamic faith remains the most important single factor promoting national unity, and religion continues to be the basic bond between the varied elements of Moroccan society.

Islam is the official religion of Morocco, and the links between government and religion are firm. According to a statement by the Prime Minister in December 1970, all Moroccan legislation is inspired by Islamic principles. The legal system is actually a mixture of civil and religious law, but only cautious attempts have been made to modify Islamic law governing personal status. The state constructs and maintains numerous mosques and pays the salaries of many, but not all, mosque officials. In 1965, there were an estimated 10,000 mosques in Morocco, staffed by 32,000 persons. Government funds for religious purposes derive in part from religious endowments (*habous*). Before independence these funds were in private hands, but they are now administered by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Affairs and Properties, one of the most conservative agencies of the Moroccan Government.



FIGURE 18. Poster depicting scenes from the Koran. These are sold in the *suqs* and at the village markets throughout Morocco. They are used for display and to teach reading. (U/OU)

Combining political and religious authority, the King is "prince of believers," the official Imam, or head, of the Muslim community. As Imam he is responsible for insuring respect for Islam, defending it against external threats, and protecting public morality (which entails the use of censorship). Although these duties are performed through the exercise of temporal power, the authority for their accomplishment rests basically in the Imam's religious mandate. Further strengthening the King's position is the common belief that he possesses *barakah*, an aura of holiness which implies a kind of supernatural power. The Friday sermons in the mosques, which deal with both social and religious themes, are sometimes prepared by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Affairs and Properties and are delivered in the King's name. Public denigration of Islam is not tolerated. The Penal Code of 1962 prescribes a fine and 6 months to 3 years of imprisonment for anyone who interferes with a religious ceremony, and Article 37 of the 1970 constitution provides for the lifting of parliamentary immunity from a deputy who attacks the Muslim faith or violates the respect due to the King as Imam. Religious conformity continues to be stressed in many ways. In 1966, for example, the King announced that prayers would be made compulsory in all schools and that there would be an increase in the number of Islamic subjects taught.

Strongly supporting the official conservative point of view on religion is the Moroccan Association of Ulama, consisting of several hundred Islamic scholars. This organization was founded in 1961 to strengthen Muslim religious life, its stated purposes being to "call the nation back to God," to combat "moral and social decay," to sponsor religious instruction, to oppose Christian missionary activities, and to broaden the international appeal of Islam. The members of the association meet in regular congresses to discuss religious matters and related problems. At a meeting in 1968, they proposed that both civil and criminal

FIGURE 19. Muslims prostrated in prayer. Normally, public prayers are held in the local mosque on Friday, but large open spaces are sometimes used. Women do not participate in public prayer with men. (U/OU)

law be reviewed by Sharia experts to insure conformity with Islamic principles, that prayer rooms be established in all government offices, and that an agency be created to supervise public morals and enforce the segregation of men and women on public beaches.

Moroccan Muslims belong to the Sunni sect of Islam and adhere to the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence. The organizing principles of the Muslim community are embodied in the Sharia, a legal and moral system which, in theory, regulates every aspect of life. Until 1912 the Sharia served as Morocco's unwritten constitution, and it is still of importance in matters involving personal status, such as marriage, divorce, adoption, and inheritance. All orthodox Muslims are agreed on the basic tenets of their faith. The central body of dogma includes belief in the oneness of God, or Allah; in the Prophets of God, the last and greatest being Muhammad, who revealed God's design to man; in the Koran, Islam's holy book, containing the word of God in eternal form; in the angels, intercessors with God and guardians of men, headed by Gabriel, who transmitted the Koran to Muhammad; and in the Last Judgment, when God rewards the righteous and punishes the wicked. The essential duties required of the Muslim, sometimes known as the "pillars of Islam," are fivefold: 1) to profess the faith, "There is no god but God and Muhammad is his Prophet"; 2) to pray five times daily at fixed intervals (Figure 19); 3) to observe a daylight fast during the month of Ramadan, the ninth month in the Muslim calendar (children and the sick are relieved of this obligation); 4) to give alms to the poor; and 5) if physically able, to undertake the pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca at least once in a lifetime. The extent of observance among Moroccan Muslims varies according to individual orthodoxy and piety. Perhaps fewer than half perform the daily prayers. The fast of Ramadan is generally adhered to, however, and those who can afford to do so usually give generously to the poor. Comparatively few are able to make the trip to Mecca.

While orthodox Islam emphasizes formal belief, ritual, and a knowledge of the Koran, folk Islam serves a mainly illiterate population among whom animistic beliefs are still prominent and Islamic ritual is often only casually observed. Its practitioners nevertheless consider themselves pious Muslims and see no contradiction between their indigenous beliefs and those of orthodox Islam. They see the physical world as populated by spirits, both good and evil, and they rely on the power of magical personalities or objects to gain the favor and support of helpful spirits and to ward off evil ones. Certain men, and sometimes women, have gained a reputation for possessing supernatural powers, and after their death, or even before, have come to be worshiped as saints and intermediaries. Magical rites, incantations, and charms play an important role in daily life, particularly in dealing with one of the most prevalent expressions of the multitude of malevolent powers, the "evil eye." A glance of the evil eye is believed capable of causing any ill to which man is heir, including death. To counteract it, charms and talismans are carried on the body, sewn into clothing, or in some way kept near the individual. These may take the form of beads, verses of the Koran wrapped in packets, trinkets of geometric shape, or almost any object of curious design. The number five (*khamsa*) has peculiar significance in whatever form—a five petaled leaf design, five dots in a tattoo, stylized patterns of the five fingers (Figure 20). A courtyard wall or the



FIGURE 20. This pendant of five fingers is worn to counteract the evil eye. It is sometimes called the hand of Fatima, after the Prophet's daughter. (U/OU)

doorjamb of a house often has a handprint painted on it to gain protection for the household. Even Western-educated Moroccans may wear a *khamsa* pendant to avoid bad luck.

Folk Islam stresses a personalized view of nature. For example, the death and resurrection of fields and meadows is believed to be a regular occurrence, and the practice of agriculture is marked by various seasonal festivals and rites. At its most primitive level, the popular religion evolves into an almost undisguised nature worship. Certain caves, high places, springs, rocks, and trees are venerated, votive offerings being made at such sites. In some areas, "holy trees" are considered to have the power to facilitate conception. Similarly, the elements of water and fire are frequently linked to fertility; young married women may be immersed in water or made to jump over fire (Figure 21) in the belief that this will prevent sterility.

A characteristic of North African Islam, the cult of saints has been effectively incorporated into popular Moroccan belief. Saints, or marabouts, are believed to have *barakah* and the ability to perform miracles. The worship of a saint is centered around his person, if living, or otherwise around some place or object associated with him, most commonly his tomb. There are thousands of saints' tombs throughout Morocco (Figure 22), but only a few have become the center of a fully developed devotion, which involves not only the tomb and its surroundings, but also the saint's living descendants in the male line. Certain tombs are within the precincts of local mosques; others are located at a natural site—for example, a brushwood thicket, a hillock, or a spring. Many rural people make regular pilgrimages to the tomb of their most revered saint, frequently leaving personal items—an amulet, a lock of hair, strips of cloth—on or near the saint's resting place as a mark of reverence (Figure 23).

Historically, one of the main influences on Islam in Morocco, as in north Africa generally, has been the religious brotherhoods. The once powerful brotherhoods, or orders, whose origins date back at least to the 11th century, have had both a religious and political role in society. They helped to spread a popular version of Islam and were instrumental in providing Morocco with a sense of unity through a countrywide

FIGURE 21. Young girl jumping over a fire, a ritual practiced in parts of southern Morocco in the belief that it will insure fertility (U/OU)



FIGURE 22. This plain, domed, whitewashed building is typical of many saint's tombs that dot the Moroccan landscape (U/OU)

network of *zawirahs* (lodges or headquarters) during the late middle ages, a period of weak central government and strong tribalism. By the mid-19th century, many had degenerated into aggregations of mystics whose ecstatic excesses were opposed by the ulama, the guardians of orthodox Islam. Other brotherhoods in that period turned to politics, and some became nuclei of early resistance to French and Spanish encroachments. With few exceptions, the most active orders in the first half of the 20th century were Berber in character; many of these collaborated with the protectorate regime, which encouraged their antinationalist tendencies. By supporting these brotherhoods and sponsoring new ones, the French hoped to wean the Berbers from Islam, weaken the nationalists of orthodox persuasion, and strengthen their own position. However, the French unwittingly helped to diminish the importance of the brotherhoods by centralizing the government, thereby eliminating certain functions which they had formerly performed. They were further weakened in the early 1900's by the Salafiyah reform movement, which sought to eliminate heterodox religious practices, as manifested in the orders, by encouraging a return to orthodox Islamic principles. Mohamed V, father of the present King, ultimately identified himself with the reformers, and in 1946 he forbade the establishment of new brotherhoods and the formation of *zawiyahs* without royal permission. With the brotherhoods in decline by the mid-1950's, the Salafiyah also lost much of its force, but its spirit still infuses the pronouncements of Istiqlal leaders and others concerned with the preservation of national and religious values.

Still functioning in contemporary Moroccan society but scorned by the educated elite, the religious brotherhoods combine elements of Islamic mysticism, or Sufism, animistic beliefs, and Sunni theology. Each brotherhood is headed by a sheikh, the group's spiritual leader, and each has its own ceremonial rituals, special prayer, and emblem. In the past, the rituals of some included self-flagellation, violent dancing, and snakehandling. Membership is on an informal basis. In 1962, the number of active members in the country was placed at about 10% of the population. The two largest brotherhoods at that time were the Tidjaniya and the Derkawa, both of which were organized in the 18th century. The Tidjaniya, which has its mother *zawiyah* in Fes, is considered the most orthodox of the groups. Unlike most brother-

FIGURE 23. Entrance to a local saint's tomb in the High Atlas. Strips of cloth, left by a worshiper, may be seen hanging on the door. (U/OU)

hoods, which draw the majority of their members from the lower strata of the population, the Tidjaniya recruits some from the middle class.

The Christians of Morocco are located chiefly in the larger towns and cities, particularly Casablanca, Rabat, Tangier, Tetouan, Oujda, and the Meknes area. Similarly, the Jews are concentrated primarily in the urban centers. A significant reduction in the size of the Christian and Jewish groups has occurred in the past 20 years. The Christian community totaled about 535,000 in 1952 and the Jewish community approximately 215,000 in the same year, in contrast to 1971 estimates of 180,000 and 31,000, respectively. Most of the decrease in the number of Christians reflects the exodus resulting from independence, while the decline in the number of Jews has been caused primarily by large-scale emigration to Israel.

The beginnings of Christian missionary activity in Morocco date back to 1234, when a Roman Catholic Franciscan priest was appointed Bishop of Morocco. The succession lasted until 1566, at which time the jurisdiction passed to the Archbishop of Seville. In 1630, the Apostolic Prefecture of Morocco was established at Tangier, and there has been no interruption in the Moroccan succession since that time. However, the Catholic community remained small until the establishment of the protectorate in 1912 and the subsequent influx of Europeans. In 1923, a separate apostolic vicariate for the French Zone was created at Rabat. Both jurisdictions were eventually raised to the status of archdiocese, the see of Rabat in 1955 and the see of Tangier in 1956. The archdioceses of Tangier and Rabat come under the direct authority of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in Rome, as Morocco is considered a mission territory. The Archdiocese of Tangier, which comprises only Tangier and former Spanish Morocco, ministered to about 25,000 baptized Catholics in 1970. The Archdiocese of Rabat, encompassing the remainder of the country, served approximately 150,000 Catholics in the same year. Each archdiocese is subdivided into parishes, which constitute the basic unit of church organization. The Franciscan Order is administratively responsible for the church in Morocco. Franciscans occupy the highest positions in the hierarchy and predominate at all levels of the ecclesiastical organization. Church leaders traditionally have been born outside the country. The Archbishop of Rabat is a French citizen and the Archbishop of Tangier is a Spaniard.

Statistics relating to the Roman Catholic establishment in Morocco for 1970 indicate that there were 86 parishes and approximately 65 places of worship. These were served by 294 priests, about two-thirds of whom belonged to religious orders. In addition, there were 591 nuns. Schools conducted by Catholic religious personnel numbered 56, and church-run charitable institutions, including hospitals, totaled 22. A number of lay organizations function at the parish level, one of the most active being the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, a welfare organization whose local units are federated into a central council for all of Morocco.

There has been some Protestant activity in Morocco by British, U.S., French, and internationally supported groups since 1883. The missions usually have been prudent enough not to arouse hostility, but they have made few converts. Information derived from the *World Christian Handbook* for 1968 indicates that the only established Protestant denomination at that time was the Evangelical Church of Morocco, of French origin, which claimed a total community of 2,500 persons. Missionary groups listed were the Bible Churchmen's Missionary Society, the Emmanuel Mission, the Gospel Missionary Union, the North African Mission, and the Seventh-day Adventist Mission. The North African Mission claimed a membership of 350; no figures were presented for the others. North American Protestant sources in 1970 reported a number of other denominations and missionary organizations having representatives in Morocco. These included the Berean Mission, the Church of the Brethren, the Churches of Christ, the Fellowship of Independence Missions, the Mennonites, the Southern Baptist Convention, and the United Church of Canada. The number of North American missionary personnel active in Morocco was given as 73.

Most of Morocco's Jewish population has consisted of Arabized Jews, descendants of immigrants of ancient times and converted Berber tribespeople. Practically indistinguishable from their Muslim counterparts, they speak a Judeo-Arabic dialect and share some of the animistic beliefs which have influenced Islam in Morocco. The emigrants to Israel have come almost exclusively from this group. Jewish leadership in Morocco, as elsewhere in North Africa, rests in the hands of Sephardic Jews, descendants of refugees from 15th and 16th century Spain. Stressing education, both religious and secular, they constitute a small, skilled group whose services are valued and who frequently have a high social status.

The central body of Moroccan Jewry is a Rabat-based Moroccan Jewish Communal Council, in which local communal councils are represented. The central council exercises no supervisory responsibility over the

local councils but serves as the official point of contact with national authorities. Membership in the local bodies varies in size and is restricted to prominent Jews of the community, such as synagogue administrators and well-to-do businessmen. Responsibilities of the communal councils relate to welfare activities for the needy and for youth, provision for religious observance, and administration of communal financial affairs. The actual scope of their activities has depended on local leadership, and with the steady decline in the number of Jews, many of the councils have ceased to operate effectively. Synagogues are found in most cities which have a Jewish quarter and occasionally in the countryside (Figure 24). There are three in Casablanca, which has the largest and most active Jewish community. Casablanca is also the Moroccan headquarters for a number of international Jewish organizations which have been working to raise health, educational, and vocational levels of the generally poverty-stricken Moroccan Jews.

Despite the conservative character of the national religion as it is officially expounded, Morocco has been fairly tolerant of its religious minorities, permitting freedom of worship for both Jews and Christians. The 1958 Code of Moroccan Nationality made Jews full and equal citizens of the state, and their persons and property are legally protected. Nevertheless, a few Jews were subjected to personal attacks after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The Penal Code prohibits religious proselytism by non-Muslims, and the government tends to view as subversive any interest evinced by Moroccan Muslims in other religions. The Minister of Islamic Affairs and Properties (a post now combined with the Ministry of Culture) asserted in 1967 that Christian missionary activities were an incitement to political disloyalty, since the King is not only the head of state but also the religious leader. It is assumed however, that no Moroccan Muslim would ever wish to forsake Islam, and the threat of social ostracism has always served as a powerful deterrent to conversion.

H. Education (U/OU)

1. The role and problems of education

Moroccan education—a hybrid of secular and religious, public and private, and Arab and French elements—fails to reach more than half of the school-age population and is otherwise unsuited to national needs. At independence, the nation inherited two parallel but essentially independent educational systems, one traditional and the other modern. Since that time, despite resistance by conservatives, the importance of traditional education has tended to diminish, as the government has promoted development of the modern system. Its development, however, has been retarded by a chronic scarcity of funds and by the inability of government policy-makers and educators to implement a feasible education plan and to resolve certain longstanding problems that plague the system. One of the most serious difficulties, for example, concerns the language of instruction. Most Arab parents are illiterate and employ colloquial Arabic at home; yet, school children are required to learn literary Arabic, as well as French, a knowledge of which is virtually a prerequisite for admission to secondary school. Berber-speaking children, on the other hand, must learn both

FIGURE 24. Synagogue in the Atlas foothills outside Marrakech (U/OU)

colloquial and literary Arabic, in addition to French; consequently, these children often enter secondary school without an adequate knowledge of any of the three.

After independence, the government undertook a rapid expansion of public education, particularly at the primary level. Simultaneously, Moroccan educators and politicians endeavored to "Arabize" the system by reforming curriculums, replacing foreign instructors with Moroccan nationals, and promoting the use of Arabic as the language of instruction. Another major objective was that of unifying Moroccan education. Having recognized the importance of developing an integrated and relevant educational system, as well as the desirability of fostering a knowledge of Moroccan history and culture, the people generally have supported these policies. Sharp differences have arisen, however, among national leaders regarding the means and pace of implementation. During the immediate postindependence period, largely at the urging of Istiqlal partisans, programs designed to Arabize the educational system were pushed vigorously. The resulting decline in academic standards, coupled with difficulties that arose concerning the instruction of modern skills and sciences in Arabic, subsequently forced policymakers to slow the pace of Arabization and to reinstitute some of the French pedagogic methods and practices. As a result, bilingual instruction in Arabic and French is commonplace in primary schools, and French is the main language of instruction in postprimary education. Moreover, the most important educational goal—that of free and universal instruction—has eluded the government.

As the public school system has expanded, academic standards have declined markedly, and graduates of primary school often are little more than functionally literate. Even those who graduate from secondary school, where a classical curriculum has been emphasized at the expense of scientific and technical training, find it difficult to obtain jobs. Disenchantment with public schools has sustained a high demand for private education, especially among members of the elite, many of whom prefer to send their children to schools operated by the French University and Cultural Mission (MUCF) and later to French universities. Thus, during the late 1960's and early 1970's, somewhat over 10% of all secondary students attended private schools; about 60% of all MUCF students were Moroccans. In addition to facilities administered by the MUCF, private schools also are operated by a Spanish cultural mission and by Muslim, Catholic, and Jewish groups. Because a number of entities are involved in the operation of private schools, and because governmental regulations concerning curriculums are not uniformly enforced, the content of private education differs considerably from that of public education. The curriculums of modern private schools tend to resemble those of Western European educational systems rather than those of Arab systems, whereas many of the Muslim-operated private institutions adhere to a traditional curriculum.

The public school system, including higher education, is financed almost exclusively by the central government. Private Muslim schools also receive governmental support in the form of loans and subsidies for teachers' salaries. Educational expenses of the Moroccan Government increased almost fourfold during the years 1956-71, but the proportion of the national budget allocated for education changed little during the period. Most foreign educational assistance emanates from France; in accordance with provisions of a French-Moroccan agreement, moreover, MUCF schools are staffed with French teachers who are paid by the Government of France.

Although the government has made progress in building new schools and increasing enrollment, it has been less successful in adapting a largely French-oriented system to the realities of domestic life. Many groups are sharply critical of government educational programs, and frustration and social discontent among youth are widespread. Secondary school and university students, occasionally aided by their parents, frequently go on strike over issues relating to educational policies, poor housing facilities for pupils, and the lack of job opportunities. Opposition political parties frequently denounce the slow pace of educational reform but evidently lack realistic programs of their own. Nevertheless, Moroccans generally agree that education is important for national development and should have a large share of public funds; most approve of state control of the educational system, as well as of the government's authority to regulate private schools.

Since 1970, student activists have manifested a greater tendency to stray from purely educational issues and to become involved in political matters. The January-April 1972 student strike, which disrupted the educational process, stemmed from both educational and political grievances. Moreover, the leading student organizations appear to have strengthened their links with national political parties. Formed in 1956, the National Union of Moroccan Students (UNEM) is the largest student organization. Although aligned with the UNFP, a non-Communist leftwing party, the UNEM is basically autonomous. The

UNEM claims a membership of almost 6,000, but few are activists. Having a pronounced radical orientation, UNEM leaders generally express more strident opinions concerning foreign capital, agrarian reform, and state intervention in the economy than do other students, and they frequently complain about the King's "reactionary," "feudal," and "despotic" personal power. The UNEM's strong antimonarchistic sentiments and predilection for radical political change are shared by some trade union youth and increasingly by university students in general, but these views have not formed the basis for a cohesive political movement. Because of its antiregime stance, the UNEM has been dealt with harshly by the government.

In contrast, members of the General Union of Moroccan Students (UGEM), the Istiqlal youth wing which was also formed in 1956, advocate respect for Moroccan traditions and champion conservative causes. To discuss student and political issues, the UGEM holds annual conferences which, like those of other student entities, must be approved beforehand by the government. The organization claims 4,000 members, but there are probably no more than 100 active participants.

a. Traditional education

Designed to impart a thorough knowledge of Arab history and culture, as well as of the tenets of Islam, traditional studies can be pursued at all levels (preprimary through higher) and in both private and public institutions. Enrollment in traditional education declined steadily during the 1960's, and by the close of the decade only about 1% of all pupils in public primary and secondary schools were engaged in traditional studies. The enrollment in private institutions specializing in traditional studies also was low (perhaps under 5,500 in the 1969/70 school year). As of 1970/71, moreover, public primary schools devoted exclusively to traditional studies (*kuttabs*) were phased out, elements of traditional education evidently having been incorporated in the curriculum of modern public schools.

Teachers of traditional studies are generally poorly trained, often being little more than semiliterate scribes (*fiqhs*). Nonetheless, Istiqlal Party officials regularly defend traditional education, regarding it as the "sole guarantee of preserving the Arabic language and Islamic culture." This position has probably been instrumental in the retention of specialized traditional institutions at the preprimary and postprimary levels of public schooling. As of 1970/71, 8,383 pupils, or 3.1% of all those enrolled in secondary education, attended traditional secondary schools (*medereseh*s) (Figure 25).

Although courses in science and mathematics were added to the traditional curriculum during the 1960's so as to give pupils some preparation for modern studies, *medereseh* graduates are not admitted to Morocco's leading institution of higher learning, Mohamed V University, which is part of the modern educational system. Instead, they must attend Qarawiyin University, in Fes, or its affiliated Ben Youssef Institute, in Marrakech; in addition, the university operates the Hadith Institute in Rabat and a branch in Tetouan. As of 1969/70, 859 pupils, or 6.7% of all students at the level of higher education, were enrolled in these institutions. The total included 33 female students and 20 foreign nationals.

Having rivaled the leading universities of Europe in the training of scholars during the medieval period, Qarawiyin University (Figure 26) had declined sharply in importance by the 20th century. Despite attempts since independence to modernize the institution, the content and methodology of courses have remained basically unchanged; the curriculum, for example, continues to focus on Islamic law, Arabic literature, theology, and Hadith (traditions of the Prophet), subjects which are taught in separate faculties. In 1969/70, about 69% of all students in traditional higher education pursued religious studies, the remaining 31% having specialized in literary studies. Being essentially unprepared for entry into modern occupations, graduates often serve as judges (*qadis*) in the Islamic court system, while others engage in scholarly research, teach in traditional schools, or lecture in mosques throughout the Arab world.

b. Modern public education

Morocco's system of modern public education comprises three main levels—primary, secondary, and higher (Figure 27). A fourth level, that of preprimary education, began evolving from the traditional Koranic schools during the late 1960's; as of 1970/71, however, few children attended modern preprimary schools. Primary education extends over 5 years, pupils normally entering at age 7. One year of so-called "secondary observation," designed to develop student proficiency in the French language, is required prior to admission into regular secondary studies. Regular secondary education, which consists of two 3-year cycles, is normally attended by youngsters ages 13-18. The first cycle consists of general academic studies, whereas the option of undertaking specialized training, in either academic or technical fields, is available in the second cycle. Additionally, vocational and technical training programs designed to improve worker skills are sponsored by various government agencies. Higher education is provided at Mohamed V

FIGURE 25. Ablution courtyard, the 14th century Marinid school Bu'Inaniya, which is the largest *medereseh* (secondary school) in Fes (U/OU)

University and at various specialized nonuniversity institutes operated by government agencies. As in the French educational system, successful completion of comprehensive examinations is required for advancement from grade to grade and for admission to secondary and higher schools. Because of the importance attached to examinations, students throughout the system rely heavily on the memorization of lessons.

Throughout public education, a shortage of instructors constitutes a major obstacle to progress. In 1970/71, the pupil-teacher ratio in primary schools was 35:1; that in secondary institutions was 21:1. The pupil-teacher ratio in Mohamed V University 3 years earlier was about 20:1. As a result of governmental programs to Arabize public education, all but 18 of the nation's 32,050 primary teachers were Moroccan nationals in 1970 71. However, numerous foreign nationals, most of them French, have continued to serve as teachers in public postprimary education. At the secondary level, foreign nationals constituted 52% of the system's 13,009 teachers in 1970 71, and although the nonuniversity higher level institutes have probably been staffed predominantly by Moroccans, foreign nationals comprised approximately 53% of the faculty of Mohamed V University as recently as 1968 69.[3]

[3] In private schools during the year 1970 71, the pupil-teacher ratio at the level of primary education was considerably lower (25:1), but that at the secondary level was higher (30:1), than in public institutions. Private primary schools were staffed by 2,227 teachers, 41% of them foreign nationals, whereas private secondary schools employed 1,671 teachers, 66% of them foreign. An estimated 8,000 French teachers were employed throughout Morocco, in both public and private institutions, during 1970 71.

FIGURE 26. Courtyard of the mosque at Qarawiyin University, Fes (U/OU)

A more serious problem than the scarcity of teachers is the lack of qualification among those available. In 1969/70, only about 30% of all teachers were fully trained and qualified, the remainder having included trainees, teacher assistants, or substitute instructors. Qualified teachers are concentrated in the main cities, and the resulting shortage of competent instructors in rural areas account in large measure for the deficiencies in rural education. In addition, secondary teachers are often recruited from the ranks of the experienced primary staff, thereby tending to depress the general level of qualification among primary instructors; nevertheless, probably no more than half of all native secondary teachers have a secondary school diploma, or *baccalaureat*, possession of which is ostensibly the minimum qualification for teaching at the secondary level.

The curriculum of public primary education includes arithmetic and elementary geometry, Moroccan history and geography, and Islamic religious studies. As of 1969/70, the official language of instruction in the first two grades was Arabic, whereas Arabic and French were given equal importance in the remaining three grades. Having repeatedly endorsed the maximum utilization of Arabic, by the early 1970's public officials had come to recognize the need to retain French indefinitely as the language of instruction in most of the modern disciplines such as mathematics.

Partly because few secondary textbooks are available in Arabic, the curriculum in secondary schools is largely patterned after that of the French educational system. Students, however, are given the opportunity to enroll in a monolingual program, in which the language of instruction is either Arabic or French, or in a bilingual program. Because of limitations inherent in the monolingual program, most pupils—80% of all those enrolled during 1968/69—choose the bilingual program; the remaining pupils are nearly equally divided between the two kinds of monolingual instruction. As of 1969/70, Arabic was reportedly the language of instruction in one-third of all courses in the first cycle of secondary education; in the second cycle, its usage was limited to courses on Arabic language and literature. The use of Arabic, however, is to be gradually increased. In 1969/70, 3,175 pupils were awarded a *baccalaureat*, which is requisite for admission to university studies and teacher training.

Despite repeated reorganization of vocational and technical education, there appears to be litte incentive for the nation's youth to undertake such training. In



FIGURE 27. Basic structure of the modern system of public education, 1970 (U/OU)

1969/70, about 20% of all pupils in the second cycle, or less than 5% of the total enrollment in public secondary education, received vocational or technical training, chiefly in industrial and commercial arts; 1,106 students received technical diplomas that year. Most programs are terminal, few pupils being able to pursue postsecondary instruction. The type and quality of training, moreover, are said to bear little relationship to national manpower needs, and a considerable proportion of graduates remain unemployed or are forced to accept jobs outside their field of specialization. In view of the limitations of public vocational and technical education, the government established new training programs during the late 1960's and early 1970's outside the regular channels of public education and expanded existing ones. Designed principally to improve the skill of journeymen workers and to retrain workers for new jobs, the training is supported by various agencies, the most important being the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Youth, and Sports, which operated 21 training centers in 1969/70. A national vocational training

center to coordinate and execute all of Morocco's training needs is scheduled to be established during the period of the 1973-77 Five Year Plan.

Higher education is provided mainly at Mohamed V University, which was established in 1957 at Rabat, and has branches at Casablanca, Fes, Marrakech, and Tetouan. The university comprises four faculties—Letters and Humanities; Juridical, Economic, and Social Sciences; Mathematical, Physical, and Natural Sciences; and Medicine. In addition, the university has three affiliated entities—the Institute of Sociology; the Mohammedia School of Engineering; and the Advanced Normal School (*Ecole Normale Superieure*—ENS). Modeled after French universities, Mohamed V University awards the equivalent of U.S. bachelor of arts, master of arts, and doctorate degrees. Undergraduate programs last 3 or 4 years, depending on the field of specialization; postgraduate programs cover an additional 2 or 3 years. Possession of a *baccalaureat*, or its equivalent, is requisite for admission. Entry may also be gained, however, by successful completion of a special examination. Faculty members are civil servants, as the university is attached to the Ministry of National Education. In addition to Mohamed V University, several government-operated training facilities have the status of higher institutes. Having been organized chiefly to train administrative and technical personnel for the civil service, the institutes generally cannot be regarded as integral parts of the public educational system.

Most teacher training takes place in two types of postsecondary institutions, the so-called regional teacher training institutes, which prepare primary school teachers as well as those for service in the first cycle of secondary education, and the ENS, which trains teachers for the second cycle of secondary education. In addition, the government administers an extensive in-service training program, of 2 years' duration, at some 60 centers throughout the country.

Modern higher education has generally failed to meet the nation's needs, particularly in technical fields. Enrollment is heavily weighted toward law and jurisprudence, letters and humanities, teaching, and medicine—fields which attracted 87% of all postsecondary students in 1969/70. Disciplines related to agriculture, science, engineering, business, and sociology attracted only 13% of the total enrollment.

2. Educational attainment and opportunity

According to the 1960 census, only 13.1% of all individuals age 10 and over were literate, with the literacy rate among the urban population being more than three times higher than among rural residents (Figure 28). Monolingual Berbers were considered illiterate, as Berber is an unwritten language. In 1965, literacy among urban residents was estimated to be 40% for males and 17% for females; among rural dwellers, the figures were 18% and less than 2%, respectively. By 1970, the national literacy rate had increased to perhaps 20%, illiteracy having remained considerably higher in Morocco than in other north African countries.

FIGURE 28. Literacy rates, by age group and urban-rural residence, 1960 (U/OU)
(Percent)

AGE GROUP	URBAN	RURAL	ALL AREAS
10–14	60.0	18.2	29.8
15–19	43.1	9.8	19.9
20–29	23.8	6.4	14.3
30–39	17.7	6.1	9.4
40–59	15.1	5.2	7.9
60 and over	10.0	4.6	5.7
All ages 10 and over	27.6	8.3	13.1

Prior to independence, educational opportunities were extremely limited. In 1944, for example, only 36,000 students out of an estimated 2 million eligible children were reportedly in school, almost all in primary or vocational institutions. While the French generally discouraged mass education, they established a few schools designed to impart basic literacy and to develop agricultural, industrial, and clerical skills useful to the modern economy. Modern institutions of higher learning did not exist during the protectorate, although a few students pursued higher studies in other Arab countries or in Europe.

Since independence, total enrollment in primary and secondary education has increased more than threefold, from 450,732 during the 1956/57 academic year to 1,474,157 in 1970/71. In the latter year, as shown in the following tabulation, primary school pupils outnumbered secondary ones by almost four to one:

Primary:	
Public	1,121,970
Private	53,307
Total	1,175,277
Secondary:	
Public	298,380
Private	30,500
Total	298,880

Enrollment at the secondary level has not only been held down by the scarcity of facilities and teachers, but also by the higher academic standards that prevail at that level, as educators have concentrated on upgrading the quality of secondary schooling while tending to neglect that of the primary level. A high proportion of pupils are disqualified for further study during the preparatory, or observation, year of secondary school, while others fail after having attended only 1 or 2 years; in 1967/68, for example, only 9% of all individuals enrolled in secondary school were in grades 10-12.

To accommodate increased enrollment, the number of schools has multiplied about threefold during the postindependence period, primary facilities alone having increased from 2,132 in 1956 to 5,570 in 1965. Although schools constructed since independence are generally modern in design, many old schools, including former military barracks, remain in use. Irrespective of age, however, most facilities are inadequate and overcrowded, new school construction having failed—in view of the rapid growth in enrollment—to overcome the deficit in classroom space that existed prior to 1956. In addition, widespread disparities exist in the distribution of school equipment; most facilities are underequipped, particularly with respect to laboratory materials, and are poorly furnished. Arabic-language textbooks, other than grammar books which are imported from countries of the Middle East, were unavailable in Moroccan secondary schools until 1960, and there are still virtually no scientific or technical textbooks in that language. Generally, the condition of private schools is superior to that of public facilities. In the private sector, Muslim-operated schools were attended by 45.7% of the total number of primary and secondary students, whereas MUCF schools were attended by 29.2% of the pupils, Hebrew schools by 7.5%, and all other facilities by 17.6%.

It is estimated that roughly one-third of all Moroccan children aged 7-18, the group which normally comprises individuals pursuing primary and secondary schooling, were actually enrolled during the early 1970's, compared with about one-fifth in 1956/57. Moreover, the educational opportunities for females and rural residents remain quite restricted. Although opposition to equal educational opportunity for females declined during the 1960's, and the enrollment of girls in all levels of education grew substantially, parental resistance is still pronounced. Traditionally, girls learned to sew and perform other household tasks but received little or no formal education. In contemporary society, rural girls are usually withdrawn from school at the age of puberty. In 1970/71, females constituted 33.9% of the total primary level enrollment and 28.3% of secondary enrollment; a year earlier they made up 14.3% of those receiving postsecondary training.

Although the nation is predominantly rural, over 70% of all primary and secondary pupils enrolled during 1970/71 attended urban schools. The scarcity of opportunities for secondary education in rural areas results, in part, from the low population density, which makes it economically infeasible to construct schools in many areas; in addition, many parents are unwilling to release their children from family chores, and rural parents are more reluctant than their urban counterparts to send daughters to school.

The number of students attending institutions of higher learning is extremely small. In 1969/70 there were 12,770 postsecondary students in Morocco, about 87% of them attended Mohamed V University; an additional 3,302 students pursued studies in foreign countries, including 2,040 in France. Among those who studied abroad, 2,692 were enrolled in universities, the remaining 610 attended specialized technical schools. Conversely, only 638 foreign students, or about 5% of all individuals enrolled in higher education, attended Moroccan institutions.

I. Artistic and cultural expression (U/OU)

Morocco has a varied cultural heritage, the product of its location between Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. At the base of the Moroccan cultural tradition are Berber music, dance, and folk arts, to which has been added the Arab-Islamic contribution of literature and learning. The Arab invasion, beginning in the seventh century, brought a body of Islamic beliefs and scholarship which provided the framework for the intellectual life of the region for more than 1,000 years. European influences are also present, specifically those of Spain and France, the former stemming from Morocco's long association with Spain in the Middle Ages and the latter from the 20th century French presence in the country. Noticeable, but of much less importance, are Ottoman Turkish and African influences.

Intellectual expression in Morocco historically has been the domain of the few. In a society which is essentially pastoral and tribal, the literati has enjoyed considerable prestige, for among the rural people the written word is invested with a certain mystic importance. For centuries, the city of Fes has been the traditional intellectual center of Morocco. Founded in A.D. 808 by Moulay Idriss II, it had acquired

considerable fame by the 10th century. Koranic theology and Muslim law were taught in its mosques, and respected scholars lectured on philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, and music. Fes reached its zenith of intellectural renown in the Muslim world in the 13th and 14th centuries under the Merinid Sultanate.

Although the vitality of the late medieval period is long past, the nation's cultural legacy remains a source of pride and inspiration for Moroccans, and the government is showing an increasing interest in fostering cultural expression as part of its effort to encourage a national consciousness and achieve a national identity. A Ministry of Culture was established in 1967 to coordinate official activities in the fields of art and literature, and it is now combined with the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Properties. Comprising departments of Archaeology, Architecture, Cultural Action, Libraries and Archives, Museums and expositions, Performing Arts, and Plastic Arts, the ministry has been concerned with the study of various aspects of Moroccan culture, the sponsorship of concerts, theatrical productions, and lectures, and a variety of other activities directed toward promoting a wider awareness of the nation's cultural heritage.

1. Literature and drama

Although traditional Moroccan literature included histories, commentaries, biographies, poetry, and tales, the heaviest emphasis was placed on studies of the Arabic language, the Koran, and religious traditions. Literary accomplishment was in harmony with the general syllabus of Islamic learning. In time, the formalism of the religious approach tended to cramp literary creativity, and verbal perfection came to be sought above originality. A new twist given to an old theme, or a small step toward stylistic perfection, especially in poetry, served to justify the writer's labors. Inherited forms were faithfully preserved.

There has been no notable renaissance in Moroccan letters, and few literary works of distinction have been produced in the 20th century. Modern Moroccan prose might be said to have emerged in the 1930's, influenced by Arabic translations of Western authors. The dominant theme has been that of political and religious revolt. From 1947 to 1956, many clandestine works of a militant nature were circulated, reflecting the concerns of the nationalist movement. Since independence, literary expression has dealt largely with the Moroccan-French struggle and with social problems and reform.

The best known Moroccan authors write in French. One of the few prominent literary figures is novelist Driss Chraibi. Among his best known works is *Les Boucs* (The He-goats), in which he condemns Europeans for attracting non-Westerners and then rejecting them on racial grounds. Another is *Le Passe Simple* (The Past Perfect), which deals with the conflict between a dogmatic Muslim father and his Westernized son. Through the character of the son, Chraibi boldly criticizes Moroccan institutions. Another well-known writer of fiction is Ahmed Sefrioui, who has published short stories dealing with the life and people of Morocco. His best known collection is *Collier d'Ambre* (Necklace of Amber). It has been said that Sefrioui, in his stories, achieves a harmonious mingling of oriental sensibility with occidental culture. An unusual figure in Moroccan letters is Mahjoubi Ahardane, who is both a poet and an artist and who has long been active in Moroccan political life, having served as Minister of Defense (1961-64) and of Agriculture (1964-66). In February 1968, a collection of his poems *Cela reste Cela* (It Stays the Same)—was published in Paris at the same time that some of his drawings were being exhibited in Versailles.

Traditionally, poetry has been regarded as the highest use of language, and the ability to express oneself in poetry is still considered a mark of the cultivated man. Rhymed prose is also admired and has been used extensively even in scholarly works. Only recently have modern poets begun to digress from the traditionally strict rules governing meter and rhyme. Recognized contemporary Moroccan poets include Embarek Kittan-i, Ben Brahim, and Ahmed Ziani.

Oral literature is one of the most enduring of the folk arts in Morocco. Tales and poems in Berber and dialectal Arabic are a familiar source of entertainment among the rural population and can be heard also in the cities. The subject matter is immensely varied—historic incidents, ancient myths, tribal origins, exploits of heroes and saints, animal fables, and romance. Stories and poems are delivered by traveling storytellers (*rawis*) before gatherings in marketplaces, at local festivals, and at family celebrations (Figure 29). Sometimes they are sung by the performer, either self-accompanied or accompanied on a single musical instrument by a companion. Common among the Berbers of central Morocco is the *tanshat*, a kind of socioreligious poem delivered in the form of a chant. The poet performer (*anshad*) composes the *tanshat*, using comtemporary themes which he relates to the virtues of Islam. This kind of poem is frequently heard on Berber-language radio programs. Especially noted are the poet performers of the Ait Haddidou tribe,

FIGURE 29. Storyteller entertaining a large audience in Tangier (C)

whose verses often include barbed political and social commentary reflecting adversely on the competence of the central government.

Drama is not a part of the Berber or Arab tradition. The theater was apparently unknown in Morocco until it was introduced by the French in the 20th century. Although early Moroccan nationalists employed their own acting companies and experimented with original theatrical productions to promote their cause, drama is still regarded primarily as a European art form and is generally restricted to urban areas. Theater groups function in several cities, some under private sponsorship and others supported by the government. There is also a Moroccan National Theater, as well as a government-sponsored dramatic research center and a dramatic arts school. Most of the plays produced are the works of European dramatists, both classical and modern. Development of a more widely available native Moroccan theater is inhibited by several factors, including a shortage of financing and a difficult language problem. The majority of Moroccans are unable to understand classical Arabic, and the colloquial version of the language is generally unsuitable for expressing abstract ideas.

2. Music and dance

What is commonly referred to as "classical" Moroccan music is partially Andalusian in origin. Containing Spanish, Moorish, and Arab elements, it consists of lengthy ensembles of musical unities called *naubahs*, each of which has five measures. There are four fundamental modes—solemn, gentle, fiery, and serious—each following a precise pattern. Poems of a romantic nature are frequently set to this type of music. Important orchestras in the larger cities regularly play Andalusian music, and there is a government-sponsored Andalusian Music Association which maintains a school of classical music in Casablanca.

Although some of the popular music heard in the cities, particularly in the northern part of the country, borrows from Andalusian melodic strains, much of it is likely to be of Western or Egyptian origin. U.S. jazz and rock are said to especially attractive to Moroccan youth. Moroccan folk music, heard as an accompaniment for storytellers and dancers on festive occasions and for singers of religious chants (Figure 30), derives from ancient Berber tribal music and the folk tunes of roving bedouins and camel herders. It is dissonant to the Western ear, and its rhythms are complex, reflecting African influences. Some urban Muslims consider it barbarous, and sporadic efforts to suppress it were reportedly made after independence.

Traditional musical instruments include the *rebab*, a one- or two-stringed viol; the *kemanjah*, a two- or three-stringed fiddle; the *oudh*, or lute, a stringed instrument; the *tahr*, a tambourine; and the *drbugkha*, a drum (Figure 31). Both the *rebab* and the

FIGURE 30. Drummers and flutists of a national brotherhood (U/OU)

kemanjah are played with a bow, while the *oudh* requires a plectrum. A small drum, the *agwal*, is used by itinerant musicians and storytellers. Other popular instruments associated with Moroccan folk music are the *samar*, a double pipe with two reed mouthpieces; the *awwada*, a flute which has also been used traditionally for purposes of divination; and the *raitah*, an oboe, frequently played at celebrations of weddings and circumcisions.

Dancing has been closely associated with folk music. It is a common feature of Berber social life, taking place on many occasions calling for celebration. In the opinion of at least one scholar, the folk dance and its accompanying music constitutes the Berbers' most creative activity. Each tribe or region has its own distinct dances to be performed at local festivals, and the best of the performing groups participate in an annual Festival of Folklore held at Marrakech. A typical dance form, widely observed in the central Grande Atlas, is the *haidus*. The *haidus* is associated particularly with the festivities common on the nights of Ramadan. Although it is usually performed by women, some versions involve men and women dancing shoulder to shoulder. Another well-known Moroccan folk dance is the *ghedra*, popular in the southern regions of the country. Restricted to women, the *ghedra* is performed individually and requires intense concentration, the dancer assuming a kneeling position and moving the head, shoulders, arms, hands, and fingers in a complicated rhythmic pattern. According to one observer, the dance is unmistakably African in its forcefulness and its strongly erotic undertone.

FIGURE 31. The classical orchestra is made up mainly of bowed and plucked string instruments—the *rebab* (or rebec), violin, lute, zither—but also includes drums. (*top*) Zither and lute (*above*) *Rebabs*, a type of the viol. (U/OU)

3. Architecture

Morocco's most distinctive cultural manifestation is its architecture. The Arab invasions contributed architectural forms and decorative arts from the Middle East, employed notably in the construction of mosques, marketplaces, tombs, and palaces; and a distinctive Hispano-Moorish style flourished from the



FIGURE 32. Detail of a porch at the 16th century Saadian tombs, Marrakesh, which shows Moorish arabesque carving at its finest (U/OU)

12th to the 16th centuries (Figure 32). Some of the ancient buildings, neglected for centuries, were repaired and restored under the French protectorate, which also encouraged a return to the classical forms of the past.

The great urban mosques are perhaps Morocco's finest cultural monuments. Most are rectangular in shape; however, the famous Kutubiya Mosque (Figure 33), built in Marrakech in the 12th century, is trapezoidal. While the exterior ornamentation is likely to be limited to stone tracery work bordering windows and other apertures, the interiors are graced with a lavish display of ornamental artistry, involving intricate carvings and mosaics, worked in a variety of geometrical forms, arabesques, stylized plant and flower forms, and calligraphy (Figure 34).

Much of the traditional village architecture tends to express the ideal of man's close association with his natural environment, reflected in square or rectangular buildings with straight lines and uncomplicated design. A sense of continuity with the land is achieved by the use of local building materials. Similarly, in the towns and cities the homes of traditional design, even those of the wealthy, commonly have plain exteriors. However, the interiors occasionally reveal tiled walls, colonnades, and lavish ornamentation. Most of the newer buildings, both public and private, are essentially Western or "international" in concept, although interior decoration may sometimes include traditional elements. According to one observer, the new architectural forms are contrary to the Moroccan ideal, having "no grace, and often no soul."

4. Arts and crafts

Until the 20th century, the development of fine arts in Morocco was inhibited by the Islamic view that representation of human beings and animals would lead to idol worship. Under the influence of the French, some Moroccans began studying painting in France in the 1930's, and this art has developed quite rapidly since that time. Today a sizable group of painters are producing creative work, employing a



FIGURE 33. Minaret of the Kutubiya Mosque, Marrakech. Exterior mosque ornamentation usually involves stone tracery bordering windows. (C)



FIGURE 34. Detail of the interior of the Mosque of Moulay Idriss, Fes. The decorative calligraphy and geometric patterns are characteristic of ornamental arts in Morocco. (U/OU)

variety of styles and techniques, most of which are patterned after Western models. Many use local subject matter for their themes, but some paint abstractions. Among the better known Moroccan artists are Farid Belkahiya, Ahmed Cherkaoui, Moulay Ahmed Drissi, Jilali Gharbaoui, Ahmed Laoudiri, and Ahmed ben Drissi El Yacoubi. There are no Moroccan sculptors of any note.

A National School of Fine Arts was established in Casablanca in 1951, and a School of Arts and Folklore has been in operation in Tetouan since 1921. Both offer courses in painting, sculpture, and decorative arts, and in minor arts as well. The school at Tetouan, in particular, provides training in a wide variety of crafts, including rugmaking, weaving, ceramics, leatherwork, woodwork, metalwork, and plaster engraving.

Morocco has a proud tradition of craftsmanship dating back to the Middle Ages, but the production of handicrafts has been in a state of decline for many years as a result of competition from manufactured imports. No longer utilitarian, as they were for hundreds of years, the crafts today are plied primarily for the tourist trade, and the artistry of the craftsmen has been steadily dwindling. Much regional variation characterizes Moroccan crafts, both in what is made and in the design and colors used in making it. Rugs are perhaps the best known product, but Morocco has also been noted for its fine metalwork and decorated leather (Figure 35). Urban handicrafts were traditionally produced by skilled artisans organized into guilds. Fes has been known for its rugs, silks, linens, and tooled leather, Marrakech for its weaponry and sumptuously decorated saddles, and Safi for its pottery. Rural handicrafts have consisted mainly of pottery and textiles. Less ornate than the urban products, they are made exclusively from local materials.

The government has taken certain measures to encourage the revival of handicrafts. These include the formation of craftsmen's cooperatives (numbering 115 in 1971); regular provision of raw materials; the introduction of regulations to control quality; and, under certain circumstances, arrangements for credit from government banks. Training of young craftsmen has also been instituted through the creation of apprenticeship centers throughout the country, and pilot retail shops have been established under government auspices. Goods merchandized through the shops are sold at fixed prices. A preliminary assessment of these measures in connection with the latest 5-year plan produced a pessimistic report on the cooperatives, which were said to be in danger of disappearing because of a shortage of capital and qualified staff.

J. Public information (U/OU)

Mass communications media in Morocco, including the press, radio, and television, are fairly well developed as compared with those in other newly independent African countries. Book publishing, however, is of minor importance, and library collections are small. Because of the high rate of illiteracy, radio broadcasting is the most significant institutional medium for news, reaching all regions and practically all levels of society, but the press has a greater impact in shaping public opinion among the educated minority. As television receivers are too costly for most Moroccans, viewing is largely restricted to the major cities. Unlike radio and television, which are government monopolies, the press in the main is privately owned and reflects the views of important interest groups. Telephone service, although limited, is being extended and modernized. In 1968, a new automatic transmission center was installed, linking 13 major cities. Subscribers at the beginning of 1971 numbered almost 170,000, or an average of 11 telephones per 1,000 inhabitants.

The government employs the mass media to present a positive image of official policy. Although the King and cabinet ministers appear frequently on radio and television, opposition leaders are rarely heard. King Hassan uses these media, as well as the official and progovernment press, to appeal for order, stability, and unity, and, especially at Ramadan, for religious piety and morality. According to an observer, most Moroccans are distrustful of the institutional media, however, and, in assessing many public issues, rely mainly on word-of-mouth news acquired from relatives and friends and from gatherings in cafes, mosques, and markets. In the countryside particularly, oral communication is the principal means for disseminating information. In the mid-1960's, a survey of 1,423 rural women and 656 rural men indicated that none of the women ever read a newspaper, and only 16% listened to the radio as often as once a week; of the men, only 2% read a newspaper at least once a week, while 25% listened to the radio.

Although the constitution guarantees freedom of opinion and expression and there is no press censorship law as such, control exists in practice in the form of an ever-present threat of suspension or confiscation. The doctrine of freedom of the press is nominally affirmed in the Charter of Public Liberties, of which the press

In Fes, the art of manuscript illumination reached a high level of technique

Detail from a ceramic mosaic, the 'Attarin school, Fes

A leather artisan at work



Powder-horn and flask illustrating the beauty of old Moroccan metalwork



Old Berber pin. The ring is turned to fasten it.



A Berber carpet from the environs of Fes

FIGURE 35. Moroccan handicrafts are world renowned. Despite government effort to encourage the crafts, there has been a steady decline in quality. (U/OU)

code of November 1958 forms a part. Publication is permitted without prior authorization, but the code appears to have been designed more to establish a pattern of control than to guarantee the right to publish. For example, Article 12 stipulates that owners and others participating in the financing of publications printed in Morocco must be Moroccan nationals. In September 1960, moreover, the code was amended to authorize "preventive suppression." Under this provision, the government has the power to seize copies of any publication, including magazines and books, which might "disturb public order" or be "damaging to the basic political or religious institutions of the Kingdom," or which expresses disrespect for the King and his authority. Publications may be withdrawn from circulation, temporarily suspended, or permanently banned.

Press "censorship," which is the responsibility of the Directorate General of National Security, was frequent in the late 1960's and early 1970's. The UNFP's *Al-Raid* and the UMT-supported *Maghreb Informations*, were suspended in 1968 for openly criticizing and satirizing the government. In 1969, the editors of the Istiqlal party's French and Arabic dailies, *L'Opinion* and *Al-Alam*, were arrested for editorializing against the government's handling of Morocco's territorial claims, and the UMT weekly, *L'Avant-Garde*, was confiscated. In October 1970, *L'Opinion's* editor was sentenced to 18 months in prison for "false" reports which were thought to undermine the morale of the armed forces and contribute to public disorder. The Istiqlal printshop was ransacked by unidentified persons in February 1971, and the papers could not be published for about 30 days. Continuing seizures of the Istiqlal press appear designed less for purposes of censorship per se than for sheer harassment. Nonetheless, the authorities allow the country's press to engage in some criticism, such as complaints about the bureaucracy, corruption, government neglect of rural areas, and the lack of rapid progress toward Arabization of the public schools.

Prior to November 1971, Article 12 of the press code had never been strictly enforced, and the French- and Spanish-owned press was allowed to operate under provisional authority. The influential Mas family owned two major dailies, *Le Petit Morocain* and *La Vigie Marocaine* (The Moroccan Lighthouse), which were editorially opposed to Moroccan nationalism during the protectorate. After independence they adopted a strong proroyalist position, for which they were regularly denounced by the Istiqlal and the UNFP. Nevertheless, in November 1971, their licenses were withdrawn, but they were subsequently reconstituted under Moroccan management as *Le Matin* and *Maroc Soir*. At the same time, the license of the respected Spanish-owned *Espana y Diario de Africa* was also withdrawn.

Foreign publications issued in Morocco, and foreign newspapers, periodicals, and other printed matter imported and distributed in Morocco are subject to the press code, which prohibits the circulation of "propaganda" material of foreign inspiration and origin. The code states that distribution of any foreign publication may be banned by a decree of the Prime Minister. In addition, all imported films must pass censorship before they can be shown. Based on a code of November 1940, film censorship is exercised through a system of licensing. Censorship is primarily concerned with assuring conformity with Islamic moral precepts, although few pictures are banned on moral grounds. Many are authorized for adult audiences only. A "black list" of films with real or imagined pro-Israeli themes exists.

All foreign governments with diplomatic missions in Morocco engage to some extent in informational activities; France is one of the most influential countries involved in such activities. Despite the tensions engendered by Morocco's struggle for independence and by the Algerian conflict, the ruling elite has retained great admiration for French civilization and French culture; many educated Moroccans are more fluent in French than in Arabic. French press services still occupy an important position, with *Agence France-Presse* (AFP) continuing as a major source of foreign news. The MUCF, in addition to its schools, maintains libraries in Rabat, Tetouan, Casablanca, and other large cities. The activities of the libraries include lectures, short courses, concerts, films, and exhibitions.

The U.S. Information Service (USIS) is active in supplying materials to local newspapers and to the national radio, and U.S. cultural centers with library facilities operate in Casablanca, Rabat, Tangier, Marrakech, and Fes. Their activities include distributing publications, arranging exhibitions, lectures, and film shows, and offering English-language classes. Other foreign governments also are active in promoting informational and cultural programs.

f. Printed media

Since independence, a large number of newspapers and periodicals have been published. A wide variety of news and opinion is available, ranging from the polemical and often strident tones of the opposition press to the more detached, moderate, and generally

pro-Western views expressed in official and progovernment publications. A significant feature of the political press, however, has been its instability. Only a few papers have been published continuously; a number have been closed down, while new ones have been introduced. The causes of this instability have been the high cost of publication, low circulation, and adverse government action.

Among the most important newspapers (Figure 36) are *Al-Alam* and *L'Opinion*, both published in Rabat by the Istiqlal Party. *Al-Alam*, the oldest of the nationalist publications, is the official voice of the party, but *L'Opinion* has a larger circulation. Other influential opposition papers are the weekly organs of the UMT, *L'Avant-Garde* and its Arabic-language version, *Al-Taliah*, both published in Casablanca. The progovernment position is represented by *Al-Anbaa*, a Rabat daily published by the Ministry of Information, and by *Le Matin* and *Maroc Soir*. In addition, *Al-Shaab* (The People), an independent weekly published in Rabat, has a fairly substantial circulation.

Comparatively few periodicals are published because of such factors as a general shortage of literary production in the country, a small reading public, and competition from imported publications. In fact, the larger periodic publications are often in the nature of news magazines. One exception to the generally small-scale character of periodicals is the pictorial magazine, *Al-Atlas Moussaouara* (The Illustrated Atlas), which aims at a general audience. Popular in treatment, this Casablanca fortnightly had an estimated circulation of 20,000 in 1970. Another publication appealing to a general audience is the government monthly, *Sawt al-Maghrib*, (Voice of Morocco), which carries radio and television news and features. In addition, *Manar al-Maghrib*, (Lighthouse of Morocco), an Arabic weekly for new literates, achieves a large circulation. Of the remaining periodicals appearing in Morocco, most are house organs for specific ministries, professional or scholarly journals, or publications for special interest groups.

Morocco has one domestic press service, *Maghreb Arabe Presse* (MAP), which was established as a semiofficial national news agency, financed by Moroccan capital, late in 1959. In addition to its Rabat headquarters, MAP has offices in Casablanca and Tangier as well as part-time correspondents in every other important Moroccan town. It has spacious quarters, widespread news-collecting facilities, and the latest and most modern teletype equipment. MAP supplies news in both Arabic and French to the Moroccan media, as well as to the Palace and to some government ministries and foreign embassies. The MAP service includes dissemination, under its own name after editing, of news from all foreign wire services available in Morocco, and it cooperates with the national press agencies of Tunisia and Algeria. With revenues deriving from the sale of bulletins to subscribers, MAP reportedly receives no financial assistance from the government.

The most active and influential foreign press agency in Morocco, AFP has offices in Rabat and Tangier and part-time correspondents in other cities. Other foreign news agencies represented include Reuters, the Associated Press and the United Press International, the Italian *Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associate*, the West German *Deutsche Presse Agentur*, the New China News Agency, TASS and Novosti, several other Communist agencies, and various African national services.

Two firms, *Sochepresse* and SOTADEC (*Societe Tangeroise d'Exploitation Commerciale*), since 1970 jointly owned by the Moroccan Government and *Hachette*, a large French publishing house, actively import and distribute newspapers, periodicals, and books. Among the most popular foreign publications are *Le Monde*, *France-Observateur*, and *L'Express* from France; the *New York Herald Tribune* international edition; and the Paris-based Tunisian *Jeune Afrique*. Soviet magazines distributed in Casablanca include *Sputnik*, *The Soviet Union*, *Soviet Film*, *Rural Life*, *Moscow News*, *Works and Opinions*, *New Times*, *Sports in the U.S.S.R.*, *Foreign Trade*, *Soviet Woman*, and *Soviet Military Review*.

Because of the small market, few books are published other than textbooks and government reports. There are printing firms in Fes (*Imprimerie Artistique*), Mohammedia (*Imprimerie de Fedala*), and Rabat (*Imprimerie de l'Agdal et Inframar*), and a Casablanca publisher (*Dar El Kitab*) lists itself as publishing books on philosophy, law, and other topics in Arabic and French. Most books are imported from France or from African and Middle Eastern countries, particularly Egypt and Lebanon. Modern bookstores exist in the larger cities. They deal mainly in imported French- and Arabic-language books and locally produced Arabic-language textbooks.

Morocco has two important national libraries: the General Library and Archives in Rabat, founded in 1920, and the General Library in Tetouan, founded in 1939, with combined holdings in the mid-1960's of approximately 192,000 volumes and 8,700 manuscripts. Both function also as public libraries and collaborate with each other. Reportedly it is planned that the General Library and Archives in Rabat shall become the capstone of a nationwide system of public

FIGURE 36. Selected newspapers, 1971 (U/OU)

TITLE	PLACE OF PUBLICATION	LANGUAGE	ESTIMATED CIRCULATION	REMARKS
Dailies:				
AL-ALAM (The Banner)	Rabat	Arabic	40,000	Leading Arabic-language paper; published by the Istiqlal party; edited by Adb-Karim Ghallab.
AL-ANBAA (The News)	*do*	*do*	5,000	Official organ of the Ministry of Information.
AL-KAWALIS (Backstage)	*na*	*do*	*na*	Established in 1970; independent. Edited and published by Mustapha El Alaoui.
Maghreb Informations	Casablanca	French	*na*	Established in 1965 and suspended in 1968; reappeared in late 1971. Published by Mohamed Loghlam. Reportedly linked to UMT and UNFP.
MAROC SOIR (Morocco Evening)	*do*	*do*	*na*	Established in November 1971. Edited by Moulay Ahmed Alaoui, a former high-level government official. Tends to be progovernment.
LE MATIN (The Morning)	*do*	*do*	*na*	Established in November 1971. Also edited by Moulay Ahmed Alaoui. Tends to be progovernment.
L'OPINION (The Opinion)	Rabat	*do*	47,000	Organ of the Istiqlal party; usually follows the same line as *Al-Alam*.
QUOTIDIEN MAGHREB	*na*	*do*	*na*	Organ of UNFP.
Weeklies:				
ACTION AFRICAINE (African Action)	*do*	*do*	3,000	Organ of the *Mouvement Populaire*.
AKHBAR AL-DOUNIA (News of the World	Casablanca	Arabic	*na*	Independent, satirical.
AL-AHDAF (The Goals)	*do*	*do*	*na*	Independent but oriented toward the UNFP.
AL-NIDAL (The Struggle)	Rabat	*do*	*na*	Organ of the small liberal Independent Party.
AL-OUMMAL (The Workers)	Casablanca	*do*	*na*	Organ of the pro-Istiqlal UGTM; emphasizes labor union affairs.
AL-SHAAB (The People)	Rabat	*do*	25,000	Independent.
AL-SIASSA	Fes	*do*	*na*	Founded in 1967 as successor to Ad-Dustur, organ of the Constitutional Democratic Party.
AL-TAKATLUL AS-SHAABI (Popular Grouping)	*na*	*do*	*na*	Organ of the *Mouvement Populaire*.
JOURNAL DE TANGER (Journal of Tangier)	Tangier	French	1,800	Edited by Eric Lutten.
L'AVANT-GARDE/AL-TALIAH (The Vanguard)	Casablanca	French and Arabic	10,000	Organ of the UMT; emphasizes labor union affairs.
LA VIE ECONOMIQUE (The Economic Life)	*do*	French	*na*	Politically independent but generally reflects views of French business interests in Morocco; covers economic and financial topics.
TANJAH (Tangier)	Tangier	French and Arabic	*na*	Edited by Mohamed Mehdi Zahdi.

na Data not available.

and school libraries. In the mid-1960's, it had 12 branches. These contained about 100,000 volumes. The General Library in Tetouan operated four branches. Other libraries in Morocco include several connected with government ministries, at least nine municipal libraries administered by the Ministry of Interior, and the libraries operated by the MUCF and the USIS.

The Mohamed V University library at Rabat had some 88,000 volumes as of the mid-1960's. In addition, primary and secondary schools are developing and operating libraries in conjunction with a "bookmobile" service provided by the government. The Qarawiyin University at Fes owns a famous manuscript collection containing about 1,600 old and rare items, and there are a number of outstanding private collections in the country, such as the Kittani library of Arabic manuscripts in Fes.

2. Radio

Radio is the most extensive and important modern medium of communication. It can reach most Moroccans, many of whom, although illiterate, have become interested in the world outside their villages. Almost every settlement in the country has one or more battery radios or transistor sets. Radio ownership, moreover, has steadily increased from a reported 280,000 sets in 1955 to about 1 million in 1972, or a ratio of 64 sets per 1,000 population. As a result of the practice of group listening by means of loudspeakers located in cafes and other public places, as well as by the use of private receivers among neighborhood groups, the radio audience is estimated at five to seven times the number of sets.

The radio system, inaugurated in 1928 by private groups, has been government owned since 1959, and programing is officially controlled. Broadcasting operations are the responsibility of *Radiodiffusion Television Marocaine* (RTM), an agency of the Ministry of Information with headquarters in Rabat. RTM's radio division is commonly known as *Radio Maroc*. Indicative of the importance the government attaches to radio broadcasting, the 1968-72 Five Year Plan allocated the equivalent of slightly less than US$3 million for the development of radio facilities, including new transmitters and a new studio.

Moroccan broadcasting facilities are impressive, both in terms of numbers of broadcasting stations and in the power of their numerous transmitters. AM stations are located in Agadir, Azilal, Casablanca, Marrakech, Oujda, Rabat, Safi, Sebaa Aioun, Tangier, and Tetouan, and FM stations in Casablanca, Rabat, and Sebaa Aioun.

RTM operates three networks using short-, medium-, and long-wave transmitters, as well as FM. As of June 1971, Network A, the major domestic service, broadcast continuously in Arabic for 20 hours per day beginning at 6 a.m. Network B, used primarily for foreign-language broadcasts, was on the air for 10½ hours per day in French, 2½ hours in Spanish, and 1 hour in English. Network C transmitted in Berber, using the three major dialects, for 13 hours per day. In addition, the *Voice of Morocco*, formerly *Radio Tangier*, broadcasts over both the Rabat transmitter and, by agreement with the U.S. Government, over Voice of America equipment at the Tangier relay station. In June 1970, it was on the air for 6½ hours per day in Arabic and for 2 hours each in French and Spanish.

The content of broadcasts includes music and variety, news summaries and press reviews, educational and cultural programs, public announcements, official speeches, and religious features, including readings from the Koran. In line with the government's policy of using the radio for orientation and instruction, the core of *Radio Maroc* programing is in the news and current events broadcasts and the educational and cultural programs, although the most time is devoted to music and variety. In 1961, the inauguration of a school-by-radio program added a new dimension to educational broadcasts. Recorded courses in Arabic language, history, civics, and an introduction to spoken and written French have been broadcast to primary school classes and to special classes for older children not receiving instruction; adults also tune in frequently. In addition, a new approach to the goal of mass literacy was initiated on an experimental basis in 1962. In the remote rural areas of Morocco, individuals were being taught to read and write by listening in groups to a daily morning session picked up by transistor sets especially issued for this purpose. The program began in Beni Mellal Province with some 50,000 participants.

Foreign radio broadcasts reach Morocco relatively freely. Stations in Cairo and Algiers have a following because their popular music programing is superior to that of Morocco, and their political tone is more vibrant. For more extensive information on regional and international events, Moroccans often listen to French and British stations, as well as to the Voice of America.

3. Television

Television was first established in Morocco by a private French company which began televising in Casablanca and Rabat in 1954. Subsequently, the

Moroccan Government purchased its equipment and building as the nucleus for its own operations. Experimental programs started with the opening of the 1961 Casablanca International Fair, and full operations began on 3 March 1962, the first anniversary of King Hassan's accession to the throne. Like the radio, television productions are under the control of RTM.

The sale of television receivers is a government monopoly, with the price fixed at the equivalent of about US$215, except for certain luxury categories. Sets are assembled locally from imported parts. The number of receivers has increased rapidly, from 10,000 in 1963 to about 300,000 at the beginning of 1972, and the viewing audience is perhaps as large as 2.5 million. In 1962, the government distributed 1,000 free sets to cafes in the Rabat area to encourage a large, favorable vote on the constitutional referendum. As a result of the enthusiastic response, the cafes were allowed to keep the sets for a small rental fee.

In late 1969, telecasting extended from 7 p.m. to midnight, about half in Arabic and half in French. Transmitters reach all the more densely populated regions of the country, or about 65% of the total geographic area. Programs include news, sports, religious ceremonies (particularly during Ramadan), official announcements, and performances by RTM's two theatrical troupes and its 250-piece orchestra. The agency also imports material from France, the United States, the U.S.S.R., Tunisia, and other countries. Commercial advertising was inaugurated in 1970.

4. Motion pictures

Motion pictures are an inexpensive and popular form of entertainment, primarily among urban working-class men. In 1972, there were 233 motion picture theaters, with a total seating capacity of 138,572, and a few mobile units. Annual attendance that year was 30.2 million, drawn mainly from the large urban areas. Most films shown in theaters are of U.S. origin, but some are also imported from France, Egypt, and other countries. Films with adventure themes are particularly popular. The *Centre Cinematographique Marocain*, an official organ which formerly specialized in documentaries, began producing a few full-length features with Moroccan actors in the late 1960's.

K. Selected bibliography (U/OU)

Abun-Nasr, Jamil. "The Salafiyya Movement in Morocco: The Religious Bases of the Moroccan Nationalist Movement." In Hourani, Albert, ed. *St. Anthony's Papers*, no. 16, pp. 90-105. London: Chatto and Windus. 1963. An excellent discussion of the intellectual roots of religious reform in early 20th century Morocco.

Adam, Andre. *Casablanca: Essai sur le Transformation de la Societe Marocaine au Contact de l'Occident*, 2 vols. Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. 1968. The most detailed sociological study available on the environment in Morocco's largest urban center.

———. "Casablanca: Le Role de la Ville dans la Transformation de la Marocaine," *Maghreb: Etudes et Documents*, no. 32, pp. 34-41, March-April 1969. A description of the city and its role in modern Morocco.

Ashford, Douglas E. *Political Change in Morocco*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961. A basic study although now outdated.

Charhadi, Driss ben Hamed. *A Life Full of Holes*. Translated from the Arabic by Paul Bowles. New York: Grove Press, Inc. 1964. An engaging "novel" of a young man growing up in Spanish Morocco during the 1950's. Composed by an illiterate and tape recorded by the translator, it contains a wealth of detail and poignantly describes Moroccan social life.

Choffat, Francois. "Etude de Sante Publique dans un Village Marocain," *Psychopathologie Africaine*, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 330-75, 1968. Contains a useful discussion of factors related to public health, as well as concepts and practices of traditional medicine.

Critchfield, Richard. *The Marginal Men*. New York: The Alicia Patterson Fund. July 1971. The pathetic story of a Moroccan drifter and former peasant who travels from Casablanca to Paris in search of work.

Damis, John. "The Moroccan Political Scene," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 25-36, Winter 1972. A discussion of the background and aftermath of the 1971 coup attempt.

———. "The Origins and Significance of the Free-School Movement in Morocco, 1919-1931." A paper presented to the Fourth Annual Conference of the Middle East Studies Association, held at Columbus, Ohio, in November 1970. A detailed account of the free schools and their impact on the nationalist movement.

Dethier, Jean. "Evolution of Concepts of the City and of Housing in Morocco from the Protectorate to Independence—70 Years of Urbanism and Architecture in a Developing Country." A paper presented to the 21st Annual Near East Conference, held at Princeton University in April 1970. Invaluable for an understanding of changing urban policies and programs.

Forget, Nelly. "Attitudes Towards Work by Women in Morocco," *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 14, pp. 92-124, 1962. Although based on a small sample survey, it contains an interesting discussion of popular attitudes.

Gellner, Ernest. *Saints of the Atlas*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 1969. A specialized socioanthropological study of saintly communities in the Berber central High Atlas, based on field work during the periods 1954-61 and 1967-68. Although primarily a reconstruction of traditional society, many observations on contemporary rural life are exceptionally useful.

Halstead, John P. *Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 1912-1944*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1967. A comprehensive treatment of the early Moroccan nationalist movement, its organization, and the influences shaping it.

Hart, David M. "Clan, Lineage, Local Community and the Feud in the Riffian Tribe." In Sweet, Louise E., ed. *Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East: An Anthropological Reader*, vol. 2, pp. 3-75. Garden City: The Natural History Press. 1970. An excellent structural analysis of the Ait Waryaghar tribe, based on extensive field work.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. *The Economic Development of Morocco*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1966. Contains the findings of a World Bank mission to Morocco and data on major problem areas, including population, health, education, and housing.

Johnson, Katherine Marshall. *Urban Government for the Prefecture of Casablanca*. New York: Praeger Publishers. 1970. A basic study, with a wealth of detail on various government plans and programs, including housing, education, welfare, and sanitation.

Kramer, Jane. *Honor to the Bride Like the Pigeon That Guards Its Grain Under the Clove Tree*. New York: Farrar, Straus. 1970. An amusing, well-written, and informative short novel concerning the trials and tribulations of a Moroccan family, particularly a 13-year old daughter whose reputation has been damaged.

Landau, Rom. *The Kasbas of Southern Morocco*. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd. 1969. A popular account of the author's travels in 1966 and 1967, it emphasizes the architecture of the region but also contains comments on social mores.

———. *Morocco: Marrakesh, Fez, Rabat*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1967. A brief historical account of the three cities and their artistic and cultural legacy. Excellent photographs.

Lapham, Robert J. "Social Control in the Sais," *Anthropological Quarterly*, vol. 42, pp. 244-62, July 1969. An examination of the social structure of inhabitants of the Plaine du Sais, based on field work in the mid-1960's.

Laroui, Abdallah. "Cultural Problems and Social Structure: The Campaign for Arabization in Morocco." Paper. 1971. An interesting if sometimes dogmatic discussion of language difficulties and an analysis of French-language predominance, by a professor of history at Mohamed V University.

May, Jacques Meyer. *The Ecology of Malnutrition in Northern Africa: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Spanish Sahara and Ifni, Mauritania*. New York: Hafner Publishing Co. 1967. A basic study emphasizing food resources, diets, and nutritional disease patterns.

Morocco. *Bulletin Economique et Social du Maroc*. Rabat. Various issues. A useful journal.

———. *Hesperis-Tamuda*. Rabat. Various issues. An excellent scholarly journal concerned principally with historical matters.

Rabate, Marie-Rose. "Les Jeux de l'Achoura dans la Vallee du Dra (Sud Marocain)," *Objets et Mondes*, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 239-60, Winter 1970. A rare article on little-known religious observances in the south.

Schaar, Stuart H. "The Mass Media in Morocco." Paper. American Universities Field Staff, Inc., North Africa Series, vol. 14, April 1968. One of the few studies of Moroccan communications media.

Schorger, William D. "The Evolution of Political Forms in a North Moroccan Village," *Anthropological Quarterly*, vol. 42, pp. 263-86, July 1969. An excellent discussion of the village of Mediouna, analyzing political, social, and economic changes, based on field work in 1948-49 and 1964-65.

Seddon, J. David. "Social and Economic Change in Northeast Morocco," *Current Anthropology*, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 227-29, April 1971. A brief historical treatment of change in one area of Morocco.

Speight, R. Marston. "Islamic Reform in Morocco," *The Muslim World*, vol. 53, pp. 41-49, January 1963. A short discussion of the contemporary religious situation.

Stewart, Charles F. *The Economy of Morocco, 1919-1962*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1964. An excellent historical study, emphasizing the development of the agricultural, industrial, and transport sectors and detailing the effects of economic change on social life.

Taylor, Trevor. "Reforms in Rabat," *Middle East International*, no. 11, pp. 15-16, February 1972. A brief discussion of government action after the 1971 coup attempt.

Tiano, Andre. "Human Resources Investment and Employment Policy in the Maghreb," *International Labour Review*, vol. 105, no. 2, pp. 109-33, February 1972. Detailed and technical but containing up-to-date information on unemployment in Morocco.

Waterbury, John. *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite—A Study in Segmented Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1970. An exceptional sociopolitical study which examines the social background and political behavior of the elite.

———. "The Place of the Public Administration and Administrative Elite in the Moroccan Political System." Paper. University of Michigan. 1971. An excellent discussion of the "patronage" mentality of the administrative elite and the "immobilist" bureaucracy which it fosters.

Westermarck, Edward. *Wit and Wisdom in Morocco: A Study of Native Proverbs*. London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd. 1930. A classic work listing 2,013 proverbs, with introductory text and individual explanations.

Zartman, I. William. *Destiny of a Dynasty: The Search for Institutions in Morocco's Developing Society*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 1964. A short political study containing a useful discussion of the role of the monarchy.

Glossary (U/OU)

Abbreviation	French	English
CNSS	*Caisse Nationale de Securite Social*	National Social Security Fund
EN	*Entr'aide Nationale*	National Aid
ENS	*Ecole Normale Superieur*	Advanced Normal School
JOM	*Jeunese Ouviere Marocaine*	Moroccan Working Youth Organization
MAP	*Maghreb Arabe Press*	Maghreb Arab Press
MUCF	*Mission Universitaire et Culturelle Francaise*	French University and Cultural Mission
PN	*Promotion Nationale*	National Promotion
RTM	*Radiodiffusion Television Marocaine*	Moroccan Radio and Television Broadcasting
UGEM	*Union Generale des Etudiants Marocains*	General Union of Moroccan Students
UGTM	*Union Generale des Travailleurs Marocains*	General Union of Moroccan Workers
UMA	*Union Marocaine des Agriculteurs*	Moroccan Farmers Union
UMCIA	*Union Marocaine de Commerce, l'Industrie, et de l'Artisanat*	Moroccan Union of Commerce, Industry, and Handicrafts
UMT	*Union Marocaine du Travail*	Moroccan Labor Union
UNEM	*Union Nationale des Etudiants Marocains*	National Union of Moroccan Students
UNFP	*Union Nationale des Forces Populaires*	National Union of Popular Forces

Places and Features Referred to in this Chapter (U/OU)

	COORDINATES	
	° ′N.	° ′E.
Adyliget (*see of Budapest*)	47 33	18 56
Baja	46 11	18 58
Balaton (*lake*)	46 50	17 45
Balatonfüred	46 57	17 53
Budapest	47 30	19 05
Cegléd	47 10	19 48
Danube (*stream*)	45 20	29 40
Debrecen	47 32	21 38
Dunaföldvár	46 48	18 56
Dunakeszi	47 38	19 08
Esztergom	47 48	18 45
Győr	47 41	17 38
Kecskemét	46 54	19 42
Kiskunhalas	46 26	19 30
Mindszent	46 32	20 12
Miskolc	48 06	20 47
Mór	47 23	18 12
Nyíregyháza	47 57	21 43
Pápa	47 20	17 28
Plovdiv, Bulgaria	42 09	24 45
Rétság	47 56	19 08
Székesfehérvár	47 12	18 25
Szentendre	47 40	19 05
Szentes	46 39	20 16
Szolnok	47 11	20 12
Taszár	46 22	17 55
Tisza (*stream*)	47 30	20 40
Újpest	47 34	19 05
Vác	47 47	19 08
Veszprém	47 06	17 55
Voronezh, U.S.S.R.	51 38	39 12
SELECTED MILITARY AIRFIELDS		
Budapest/Tokol	47 21	18 59
Debrecen	47 29	21 37
Kiskunlachaza	47 11	19 05
Kunmadaras	47 23	20 47
Papa	47 22	17 30
Sarmellek	46 41	17 10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL